The answer your second question is undoubtedly "yes." Promising a peacekeeping mission -- then not being able to deliver -- would be worse than not authorizing one at all. It would be worse for the credibility of the UN Security Council and UN peacekeeping, and it would be much worse for the people of Somalia. My colleagues, Patrick Duplat and Erin Weir, visited Somalia last month and concluded that: "A Security Council mandate that amounts to no more than a symbolic gesture would be one more betrayal in two decades of missed opportunities and broken promises." Their mission report and related briefing materials also hint towards answers to your first question: Can we take it as a given that a mission to Somalia would be as slow to generate forces as UNAMID, and if so, does that mean we should abandon the whole premise of a UN Peacekeeping mission to Somalia?
The title and contents of their report -- Proceed with Caution -- suggest that there is an urgent need to proceed, indeed to move forward vigorously with peacemaking processes that deliver substantive results before trying to deploy UN peacekeepers. Positive results from political negations will not come quickly or easily because of the peacemakers' assumption that the Transitional Federal Institutions constitute a viable, legitimate basis upon which to build a government in Somalia -- while many Somalis interviewed by the RI team view the TFG as an illegitimate body propped up by an occupying power (Ethiopia).
The answer your second question is undoubtedly "yes." Promising a peacekeeping mission -- then not being able to deliver -- would be worse than not authorizing one at all. It would be worse for the credibility of the UN Security Council and UN peacekeeping, and it would be much worse for the people of Somalia. My colleagues, Patrick Duplat and Erin Weir, visited Somalia last month and concluded that: "A Security Council mandate that amounts to no more than a symbolic gesture would be one more betrayal in two decades of missed opportunities and broken promises." Their mission report and related briefing materials also hint towards answers to your first question: Can we take it as a given that a mission to Somalia would be as slow to generate forces as UNAMID, and if so, does that mean we should abandon the whole premise of a UN Peacekeeping mission to Somalia?
The title and contents of their report -- Proceed with Caution -- suggest that there is an urgent need to proceed, indeed to move forward vigorously with peacemaking processes that deliver substantive results before trying to deploy UN peacekeepers. Positive results from political negations will not come quickly or easily because of the peacemakers' assumption that the Transitional Federal Institutions constitute a viable, legitimate basis upon which to build a government in Somalia -- while many Somalis interviewed by the RI team view the TFG as an illegitimate body propped up by an occupying power (Ethiopia).
Mark makes an interesting point---that the proposed mission to Somalia may be the straw that breaks the camels back. Still, it seems as if we are inching ever closer to the authorization of a large peacekeeping force there. My question is this: Can we take it as a given that a mission to Somalia would be as slow to generate forces as UNAMID, and if so, does that mean we should abandon the whole premise of a UN Peacekeeping mission to Somalia? Another way of putting this is: Is promising a peacekeeping mission--then not being able to deliver--a worse outcome than not authorizing the mission in the first place?
Mark makes an interesting point---that the proposed mission to Somalia may be the straw that breaks the camels back. Still, it seems as if we are inching ever closer to the authorization of a large peacekeeping force there. My question is this: Can we take it as a given that a mission to Somalia would be as slow to generate forces as UNAMID, and if so, does that mean we should abandon the whole premise of a UN Peacekeeping mission to Somalia? Another way of putting this is: Is promising a peacekeeping mission--then not being able to deliver--a worse outcome than not authorizing the mission in the first place?
It seems I was being a bit sanguine yesterday when I wrote, "The Council will likely recommend the Secretary General appoint a Special Representative to monitor the harassment of Mugabe's political opponents and, eventually, help mediate a transition of power." In fact, the Council was divided over what to do about the situation in Zimbabwe, giving Mugabe's a brief diplomatic victory. South Africa banded with China and Russia to block a American and British proposals to send a special representative.
Still, as I pointed out at the time, the fact that the opposition was invited to address the Security Council while South Africa was president of the Council is a step forward. Further, the official MDC spin on the meeting does not seem to far off. As an MDC official told Reuters, "the mere fact that the matter was brought forward to the UN Security Council is testimony to the fact that there is a crisis which cannot and should not escape the international community's eye and attention." A baby step, perhaps, but we are at least moving in the right direction.
It seems I was being a bit sanguine yesterday when I wrote, "The Council will likely recommend the Secretary General appoint a Special Representative to monitor the harassment of Mugabe's political opponents and, eventually, help mediate a transition of power." In fact, the Council was divided over what to do about the situation in Zimbabwe, giving Mugabe's a brief diplomatic victory. South Africa banded with China and Russia to block a American and British proposals to send a special representative.
Still, as I pointed out at the time, the fact that the opposition was invited to address the Security Council while South Africa was president of the Council is a step forward. Further, the official MDC spin on the meeting does not seem to far off. As an MDC official told Reuters, "the mere fact that the matter was brought forward to the UN Security Council is testimony to the fact that there is a crisis which cannot and should not escape the international community's eye and attention." A baby step, perhaps, but we are at least moving in the right direction.
Top Stories
>>Georgia - Russia has accused Georgia of amassing 1,500 soldiers in the upper Kodori gorge and threatened to retaliate if Georgia uses force in Abkhazi. Russia also stated that it is increasing its force levels in Abkhazi and South Ossetia. Georgia denies that it is building up troops and called the Russian action a pure provocation. EU foreign policy minister Javier Solana urged restraint during a meeting with Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov. Russia has kept a peacekeeping force in Abkhazia and South Ossetia since the 1990s, when the regions broke away from Tbilisi and formed links with Moscow. There are around 2,000 Russians posted in Abkhazia and about 1,000 in South Ossetia. >>India - President Ahmadenijad met with India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh yesterday in an attempt to seal a $7.6 billion pipeline deal, under the strenuous objection of the U.S. The pipeline would be completed by 2012 and would initially transport 60 million cubic meters of gas a day to Pakistan and India. The U.S. had suggested that India instead use Ahmadenijad's visit to press Iran to stop nuclear enrichment. India responded that it didn't need any "guidance" in bilateral relations.
>>Turkey - Turkey's parliament has approved legislation that softens penalties the EU has criticized for limiting free speech. Since 2003, Article 301 of the penal code has been used to prosecute hundreds, including Nobel Prize winner Orhan Pamuk, for "insulting Turkishness." Critics contend that the softening didn't go far enough; insulting the Turkish nation still carries a two-year penalty.
Yesterday in UN Dispatch
Top Stories
>>Georgia - Russia has accused Georgia of amassing 1,500 soldiers in the upper Kodori gorge and threatened to retaliate if Georgia uses force in Abkhazi. Russia also stated that it is increasing its force levels in Abkhazi and South Ossetia. Georgia denies that it is building up troops and called the Russian action a pure provocation. EU foreign policy minister Javier Solana urged restraint during a meeting with Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov. Russia has kept a peacekeeping force in Abkhazia and South Ossetia since the 1990s, when the regions broke away from Tbilisi and formed links with Moscow. There are around 2,000 Russians posted in Abkhazia and about 1,000 in South Ossetia. >>India - President Ahmadenijad met with India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh yesterday in an attempt to seal a $7.6 billion pipeline deal, under the strenuous objection of the U.S. The pipeline would be completed by 2012 and would initially transport 60 million cubic meters of gas a day to Pakistan and India. The U.S. had suggested that India instead use Ahmadenijad's visit to press Iran to stop nuclear enrichment. India responded that it didn't need any "guidance" in bilateral relations.
>>Turkey - Turkey's parliament has approved legislation that softens penalties the EU has criticized for limiting free speech. Since 2003, Article 301 of the penal code has been used to prosecute hundreds, including Nobel Prize winner Orhan Pamuk, for "insulting Turkishness." Critics contend that the softening didn't go far enough; insulting the Turkish nation still carries a two-year penalty.
Yesterday in UN Dispatch
Move over, Arnold -- there's a new "Terminator" in town. And this one's not heading to the gubernatorial halls of Sacramento, but to the courtrooms of The Hague.
A Congolese warlord known as "the Terminator" is being sought for prosecution, the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague has revealed. The arrest warrant for Bosco Ntaganda, was issued in 2006 but not made public and he is still at large. He is accused of conscripting children under 15 to fight in hostilities in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo between July 2002 and December 2003.Interestingly, the ICC said it had not publicized its arrest warrant for Ntaganda earlier because this may have "hindered the court's investigations." This illustrates an important dynamic in the Court's work -- and one that we have previously highlighted in reference to Uganda. Simply put, the ICC is better able to achieve its mission of bringing justice and accountability to a region when peace has already been secured. Whereas northern Uganda fell agonizingly short of a landmark peace deal, a ceasefire in eastern Congo was signed in January. Even as this peace still needs to be consolidated, now seems to be the time to begin the process of bringing to justice those who inflicted such untold misery on the innocents of eastern Congo.