The New York Times picks up this exchange between Matthew Lee and I from our last UN Plaza segment.

The idea that there is a one-sized fits all approach to rogue states I think is wrong-headed. Just because a particular policy worked for North Korea it does not necessarily follow that such an approach will work for, say, Sudan. I think, however, there is a tendency among hardliners to think that only a hard line approach will work in any given situation. Perhaps the apotheosis of this approach--which I reference in the segment above -- is John Bolton's dictate in Surrender is not an Option that he "doesn't do carrots." Full stop.

I would argue, however, that in some specific cases carrots work and in some they do not. American concessions clearly helped convince North Korea to destroy its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon two weeks ago. Yet, at the same time I do not think that the international community has done enough to pressure Khartoum into lifting its obstruction of the joint AU-UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur. Different situations call for different approaches.

When Megan McArdle poses the question, "To fight or not to fight?" she hypothesizes that the answer largely rests on whether the United States opts to involve itself in a foreign intervention. Without American participation, she contends, "no one else is going to do it for us--the African Union cannot make peace in Darfur, none of Iraq's neighbors can help it if it erupts into civil war, and so forth."

To this Matthew Yglesias adds the much-needed caveat that the participation of other countries in foreign interventions can in fact add value in terms of both military effectiveness and political legitimacy. He also rightly cautions that this argument -- that American initiative is the only way to mount a serious intervention -- can dangerously provide cover for a more naked unilateralist streak.

I would add the important reminder that not all "fighting" is equal, and, more significantly, that not all interventions must amount to combat. War-fighting, counter-insurgency, and peacekeeping are, just to name a few, all very different phenomena that each operate according to very different rules and whose effectiveness require very different types of involvement. To McArdle's example that "the African Union cannot make peace in Darfur," then, the obvious answer is of course not. The peacekeeping force in Darfur is exactly that: a peacekeeping force. Peace does not come at the barrel of a gun -- least of all at the barrel of an American gun -- and the only ones that can make peace, unfortunately, are the parties at war themselves.

This does not mean that the U.S. and other countries have no role to play in such peacebuilding situations. Rather, these type of scenarios demand, if anything, more multilateral involvement, as international diplomatic pressure -- particularly from neighboring countries with a stake in stabilizing their region -- will go a lot farther in pressing for a peace accord than will American troops.

UNESCO formally inducted eight new sites into its world heritage list. Melaka and George Town, historic cities of the Straits of Malacca (Malaysia); Kuk Early Agricultural Site (Papua New Guinea); Stari Grad Plain (Croatia); Fortifications of Vauban (France); Berlin Modernism Housing Estates (Germany); Mantua and Sabbioneta; San Marino Historic Centre and Mount Titano (San Marino); and the Wooden Churches of the Slovak part of Carpathian Mountain Area (Slovakia) were all voted in during UNESCO's meeting in Quebec City last week. Friends of World Heritage has more.

(Image: UNESCO / Milos Dudas The Wooden Churches of the Slovak part of Carpathian Mountain Area)