In Stephanie's answer to the second prompt, she writes: "It is time to put the myth of the pre-9/11 mindset to rest" with which I think I mostly concur--save with some reservations about the level of attention both the Clinton and early Bush Administration paid to the growing al-Qaeda threat, but she then nonetheless writes: "For other segments, namely the vanguard in Afghanistan/Pakistan, the military has and will continue to play a leading role in containing and reducing the jihadist threat".

I was curious who the "vanguard" is? Are we speaking of UBL and Zawahiri? If so, why would the military necessarily be best positioned to deal with them? I suspect many of the most precious high-value targets (think [9-11 mastermind] Khalid Sheik Mohammed, who was apprehended in Rawalpindi by the [Pakistani Intelligence Service], I believe with some CIA involvement) could well be hiding in major cities like Karachi or Peshawar (perhaps in even more fantastical disguises than Radovan Karadzic's!), rather than the badlands of South Waziristan. And even if there, wouldn't highly focused counter-intelligence efforts--backed up by discrete military action as/if necessary--be the best way to locate and capture these terrorists?

How do our noble Marines expending blood and treasure on 'clear hold build' in eastern Afghanistan advance the ball on this front, rather than 'over the horizon' forces poised to strike/apprehend select High Value Targets's, intelligence assets (both foreign and local) at the ready through the region, as aided by diplomatic efforts (to include 'triangulation' among India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, assorted financial assistance/pressure, police training initiatives etc). Or, stated differently, why is a militarily intensive & likely decades long nation-building effort with tens of thousands of American forces apparently a 'no-brainer' now across both major U.S. political parties when it comes to Afghanistan, particularly if much of the "vanguard" has decamped to Pakistan? (It seems Obama and McCain are only arguing about numbers and where the troops will come from, with both in favor of a "surge" in Afghanistan.) Is the seemingly perennial effort of weaning away Pashtun tribes from Taliban influences a vital national security interest of ours, do we think? If so, why? As Zbigniew Brzezinski recently put it: "We are running the risk of repeating the mistake the Soviet Union made...Our strategy is getting in deeper and deeper." I suspect others like Chuck Hagel and Sam Nunn might well agree.

For the group, and I guess somewhat related, I'm not sure others responded to the first prompt's particular prong asking what people believe is the most "underestimated" contributor to terrorism. I hazarded it was the occupation of Muslim lands. Are there any other views, with thanks for your indulgence if the answers are obvious and/or the questions appear off-topic?

Regarding Matt Levitt's point, perhaps I'm only emphasizing what he eloquently said on needing a "truly interagency strategy." And his response had the added benefit of helping ensure we steer clear of any polemics by not falling into (the often so silly) politically charged debates about Democrats only wanting to treat terror as a law enforcement issue, with Republicans just cow-boying around solely with military/unilateralist/preemptive strategies. While these are mostly caricatures and straw-men, still, it's worth highlighting that we've had nearly 200,000 service men and women in Afghanistan and Iraq day after day, for years now. That is the major use of our military today. Both are supposedly there to help us meet our objectives in the Global War On Terror. Are they, or are they instead perhaps ultimately going to make the problems even worse? Let us at least provide our men and women in uniform a succinct strategic objective for their massive labors and sacrifices? What is it?

I agree with Matt that the notion that U.S. counterterrorism policy is largely under the purview of the military is a false one. It relates, I think, to the partisan charge that the Democrats possess a "pre-9/11 mindset" when it comes to counterterrorism. Throughout the past seven years, the military has been the public face of U.S. counterterrorism efforts (the consequences of which merit their own discussion thread). But behind the scenes the same-old, pre-9/11 intelligence and law enforcement efforts have been crucial to foiling plots at home and across the globe. The twenty-or-so jihadist plots that have been rolled up since 9/11 came as a result of time-honored police and intelligence work, the success of which was sometimes predicated upon strong international cooperation. It is time to put the myth of the pre-9/11 mindset to rest.

That we need to use all of the tools in the toolbox is not a new argument. But in the context of this question, I think it is important to emphasize the heterogeneity of the global jihad and what that means for those who accept a multi-faceted approach. The global jihadist movement is not a monolithic, unitary actor that requires the same set of policy prescriptions across the board. A diverse set of actors (the al-Qaeda vanguard, regional groups, start-up cells) reside under its umbrella with varying degrees of cooperation between and among them. For some segments of the movement, the problem is primarily an intelligence and law enforcement issue. For other segments, namely the vanguard in Afghanistan/Pakistan, the military has and will continue to play a leading role in containing and reducing the jihadist threat.

The question is not whether our counter-terrorism strategy should be military or law enforcement centric, but rather how to develop and deploy a truly inter-agency strategy that employs all elements of national power to defeat a transnational adversary operating in an era of globalization.

The military is actively engaged in counter-terrorism, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq where it is fighting wars against asymmetric enemies, but I would dispute the assumption that counter-terrorism responsibility has fallen mainly under the purview of the military. At the same time, while acts of terrorism are themselves criminal activities, employing a counter-terrorism strategy that sees terrorism as more of a law enforcement issue is also off the mark. Both the military and law enforcement communities plays critical roles in counter-terrorism, but a truly effective counter-terrorism strategy is one that is intelligence-heavy and leverages that intelligence to inform a plan than employs all elements of national power, with a focus on non-kinetic tools and authorities.

Indeed, I think it's safe to say that the effort to combat terrorism at a tactical level is where we are best, employing our military, intelligence and law enforcement agencies to conduct operations, make arrests, raid safe havens, etc. It is at the level of strategic counter-terrorism, that is strategic communication, the battle of ideas, and counter-radicalization, that we are just now making strong strides forward (see our previous discussion chain). For example, highlighting al-Qaeda's bankrupt ideology is now a cornerstone of the U.S. strategic communications message.

Recognizing the relationships between our various foreign policy interests also points to the need to leverage all our authorities in a strategic counterterrorism effort. State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism Dell Dailey made this point in a lecture at The Washington Institute in December entitled An 'All Elements of Power' Strategy for Combating Terrorism. "In today's interconnected world, it is impossible to draw neat, clear lines between security interests, development efforts, and our support for democracy. American diplomacy must integrate and advance all of these goals together."

That said, I do think we are in need of some legal remedies to our current legal system. Some of these are tactical, like passage of a new Export Administration Act (EAA) that would empower the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security to conduct arrests and engage in undercover operations more easily (the last law, now somewhat outdated too, lapsed in 2001 and BIS has been operating under emergency authorities granted by the President under IEEPA).

But two immediate legal issues come to mind. First, the need to find a solution to the need to hold terrorism suspects and how to try them. As my colleague Mike Jacobson has pointed out, the United States, United Kingdom and Canada are among the countries grappling with the question of whether certain terrorist suspects should be handled in legal settings outside of the criminal justice system.

Second, the "material support" statute should also be revisited. As a series of partial convictions and hung juries in recent "material support" cases demonstrates, obtaining convictions under the current law is difficult. In some cases, prosecutors have opted not to charge defendants with providing material support to terrorists, charging them instead with other criminal activity.

The bottom line, however, is that while post-blast prosecutions hold perpetrators accountable and provide victims a sense of justice, it is not clear than in an era of ideologically-driven terrorism they provide much of a deterrent to other would-be terrorists and their supporters. Law enforcement and military action have their place within the larger counter-terrorism toolkit, but so do intelligence collection and operations, robust diplomacy and international engagement, international training and capacity building programs, financial and economic pressures and opportunities, and more.

The second part of our discussion on terrorism issues rolls on today with two On Day One user generated ideas suggesting that the next president treat counter-terrorism more as a challenge for law enforcement than a military objective.

It would seem that counter-terrorism responsibility has fallen mainly under the purview of the military. Are there advantages, though, of limiting the military's role in counter-terrorism and treating it more as a law enforcement issue? Are our laws--or international law--capable of meeting the challenges posed by international terrorism? Are there specific legal reforms that might benefit law enforcement without sacrificing on civil liberties? And if the military is going to take the lead, how should our service branches reform to meet these new challenges?