I have, perhaps, an old-fashioned view of history and just as it is hard to explain why the French were in Moscow in 1812 without Napoleon, and the rise of the Nazi party is inextricably linked to the views and personality of Hitler, its just not possible to understand al Qaeda, what it is and what it has done, without understanding bin Laden. Without him al Qaeda simply would not exist (look at the minutes of the founding meetings of al Qaeda in 1988, for instance). Without him 9/11 would have been one of many harebrained schemes in the head of Khalid Sheik Mohammed (KSM.) The Al Qaeda organization and bin Laden the man are largely co-terminus, after all it's a rather small organization today and has always been so. The Al Qaeda movement is another matter, though that too takes its strategic cues from OBL.

Peter's is an excellent article. I'd submit, however, that it conflates Bin Laden with al Qaeda and I increasingly wonder if perhaps al Qaeda the organization has outgrown Bin Laden the man. After all, a persistent AQ threat does not mean Bin Laden is still calling the shots. Sadly, if it's true that the organization has grown past the man it is another sign of just how successful he and the organization both have been.

This is a good step:

Sierra Leonean police have adopted new policy guidelines on sexual abuse and exploitation that have been drafted by United Nations officials as part of their efforts to reduce the widespread levels of violence against women and girls in the West African country.

The policy guidelines, the first in the region, were drafted by the conduct and discipline office, the gender adviser and the UN Police section of the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), according to a statement issued in Freetown by the office on Saturday.

Considering the prevalence of sexual assault and abuse in Sierra Leone, this is a good thing to see happening. This week, UNIOSIL is conducting workshops and trainings not only for police officers, but managers and other employees of the police force. Only time will tell of the impact it will make; we can only hope it's a great one.

Some of the issues in the final discussion I tried to address in a story for TIME earlier this month, so rather than rewriting that story I'm pasting it in below:

Does Osama bin Laden matter anymore? You could be forgiven for thinking he doesn't. In recent months, an impressive cast of terrorism experts and counterterrorism officials around the world has coalesced around the notion that al-Qaeda's leader is no longer an active threat to the West. They point out that he has not been able to strike on U.S. soil since 9/11 or in Europe since the London bombings three summers ago. In Iraq, his most successful franchise operation is on the ropes. Across the Muslim world, opinion polls suggest his popularity has faded, and many of his early supporters -- including prominent jihadi ideologues -- have denounced him. Even his messages on the Internet scarcely merit headlines in the mainstream media. Did you know he posted two audio messages on the Web in May? I didn't think so.

The jihad, some experts contend, has moved beyond bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Dr. Marc Sageman, a former CIA case officer, lays out the view in his new book, Leaderless Jihad, arguing that "the present threat has evolved from a structured group of al-Qaeda masterminds controlling vast resources and issuing commands to a multitude of info rmal groups trying to emulate their predecessors by conceiving and executing operations from the bottom up. These 'homegrown' wannabes form a scattered global network, a leaderless jihad." According to this assessment, two decades since its founding in Peshawar, Pakistan, al-Qaeda remains a source of inspiration for certain extremists around the world. But it's far from clear that bin Laden commands them.

This view was shared by several European officials I met at a conference of terrorism experts in Florence in May, a few days after bin Laden's most recent Internet postings. The officials told me they've found no evidence of al-Qaeda operations in their countries. If bin Laden has any role in the jihad, say the Europeans, it is merely as an icon. Alain Grignard, Belgium's top terrorism investigator, says bin Laden is now a "Robin Hood figure; 100 people are inspired by him, but very few respond to do what he wants."

If that's true, why do so many political leaders continue to warn about the threat -- or even the likelihood -- of another major terrorist attack? Why did the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate say al-Qaeda "has protected or regenerated key elements of homeland attack capability"? Why would the head of Britain's domestic intelligence service, MI5, say there were 2,000 citizens and other U.K. residents who posed a serious threat to security, a number of whom took direction from al-Qaeda? The struggle against al Qaeda -- and to a lesser extent, the quest to capture bin Laden -- has20dominated U.S. foreign policy since 9/11.

But as the U.S. prepares to elect a new President, should that remain the case? The answers to these questions don't lend themselves to easy policy prescriptions. But the best available evidence suggests that the threat posed by bin Laden's acolytes hasn't been extinguished-- and his own influence over them is greater than many analysts acknowledge. In his old stomping grounds, the jihad is stronger than at any time since he fled from the Tora Bora mountains in the winter of 2001. The Taliban is resurgent in Afghanistan, and in Pakistan militant groups have grown so aggressive that in late June they even threatened to take over a major city -- Peshawar, once bin Laden's home and the birthplace of al-Qaeda. Farther away, extremists in Europe and North Africa continue to covet bin Laden's blessing and the al-Qaeda brand name.

As has always been true in shadowy, borderless wars, measuring the strength of the enemy isn't an exact science. It's true that many of the "leaderless jihadis" have set up operations independently of al-Qaeda, but when they turn to bin Laden's organization, it's not just for inspiration but also for training, assistance and direction -- in short, for leadership. Many are able and willing to do bin Laden's bidding; they pay very careful attention to his Internet postings and follow his instructions. And although their targets have generally been close to home, their association with al-Qaeda has tended to take their ambitions beyond their borders.

What's more, many of these homegrown wannabes live in the West. It was al-Qaeda's direct involvement that helped a leaderless group of British jihadis mount the multiple London bombings on July 7, 2005, that killed 52 commuters. Two of the bombers had traveled to Pakistan, met with al-Qaeda commanders and made martyrdom tapes with al-Qaeda's video- production arm there. A year later, British investigators uncovered a plot by another cell of British Pakistanis to bring down seven American and Canadian passenger jets. According to Lieut. General Michael Maples, head of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, the plotters received direction from al-Qaeda in Pakistan.

Bin Laden's interest in British jihadis didn't end there. Jonathan Evans, head of MI5, said last year that "over the past five years, much of the command, control and inspiration for attack-planning in the U.K. has derived from al-Qaeda's remaining core leadership in the tribal areas of Pakistan." U.S. officials, too, worry that a new generation of jihadis is making the trek to Pakistan, seeking al-Qaeda's assistance. Sixteen U.S. intelligence agencies signed off on a 2007 National Intelligence Estimate that concluded that al-Qaeda has made a strong comeback in Afghanistan and Pakistan because it has found "a safe haven in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas [FATA] in Pakistan" for its operational lieutenants and top leadership. In February, Michael McConnell, director of National Intelligence, said in congressional testimony that there had bee n an "influx of new Western recruits into the tribal areas since mid-2006." Philip Mudd, the former No. 2 in the CIA's Counterterrorism Center, who is now working at the FBI to help improve its intelligence capabilities, told me, "There is a very clear, almost mathematical increase in lethality as soon as plotters touch the FATA."

If jihadis seek material assistance from al-Qaeda in the FATA, they can get guidance from bin Laden almost anywhere there's an Internet connection. He has issued more than two dozen video- and audiotaped messages since 9/11, and some of his exhortations have been acted upon. For instance, in December 2004, bin Laden called for attacks on Saudi oil facilities; in February 2006, al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia attacked the Abqaiq facility, perhaps the most important oil-production facility in the world. (Luckily, that attack was a failure.) More recently, bin Laden has called for attacks on the Pakistani state -- there were more than 50 suicide bombings there in 2007, and there have been at least 19 thus far this year.

There's some comfort to be drawn from the fact that bin Laden has not been able to strike on U.S. soil since 9/11. There is scant evidence of al-Qaeda sleeper cells in the U.S. Thanks to more effective intelligence-gathering, immigration control and the heightened vigilance of ordinary Americans, it is very hard for terrorists to slip into the country. It's always possible that homegrown wannabes will mount some sort of attack, but in contrast to the situation in Europe, al-Qaeda's virulent ideology has found few takers in the American Muslim community.

Yet bin Laden remains determined to kill large numbers of Westerners and disrupt the global economy. Since 9/11, al-Qaeda and its affiliates have bombed Western-owned hotels around the Muslim world, attacked a number of Jewish targets and conducted suicide operations against oil facilities in the Middle East; we can expect more of the same in the future. Al-Qaeda has also used new tactics and weapons -- like the surface-to-air missile that nearly brought down an Israeli airliner in Kenya in 2002. And it retains a long-standing desire to acquire a radiological bomb. But al-Qaeda's most dangerous weapon has always been unpredictability. That's why it is dangerous to dismiss bin Laden as a spent force. While he remains at large, the jihad will never be leaderless.

Today, the Security Council is poised to re-authorize the UN-African Union Mission in Darfur. The Council had split over the issue of the International Criminal Court's potential indictment of Sudanese President Bashir, a step opposed by ICC opponents -- and Sudanese allies -- like Russia, China, Libya, and South Africa. Interestingly, though, the U.S. -- traditionally wary of the ICC, but which, along with the other 14 Council members at the time, allowed ICC jurisdiction back in March 2006 -- stood with countries like Great Britain and France in pushing for the ICC's operations in Darfur not be tied to the mandate of the peacekeeping mission there.

It appears that a compromise has been reached, and today's report will simply make note of the African Union's recent appeal for the Council to suspend ICC jurisdiction. This still leaves open the option of suspension -- pending adequate Sudanese follow-through on its commitments -- but also rightly separates the imperative of protection from the work of an independent prosecutorial body.

The renewed mandate for UNAMID comes three days after a coalition of African NGOs published a report highlighting the obstacles that the force has faced since it was turned over to UN leadership in January. While this report has been cited in some media outlets as describing the "failure" of UNAMID, its more relevant takeaway is that "the international community must have the political will to make it succeed...[and] ensure that UNAMID is given the equipment and troops it needs."

As if to underscore this point, today another report has been released, this one written by a prominent aviation expert, calling out specific countries for not offering their available helicopters to a UNAMID force that desperately needs them. The content of this report properly emphasizes the importance both of providing these helicopters and of framing the advocacy discussion in a way that identifies the specific Member States -- not, say, the UN as a whole -- responsible for not sufficiently working to improve UNAMID's performance.

Without very real contributions of these helicopters and other crucial supplies, Member States remain guilty of attempting what the former African Union chief mediator in Darfur calls "peacekeeping on the cheap." If Security Council countries are serious in their desire for UNAMID to succeed, they need not only to push for peace in Darfur -- the oxygen UNAMID needs to breath -- but to also give up the money and resources that will make it an effective protection force.

Although there have undoubtedly been more plots launched by home-grown cells in the West since 9/11 than by Al Qaeda, the evidence suggests that the most dangerous plots, such as the July 2005 London bombings and the 2006 airlines plot, have all been directed by Al Qaeda.

Although Matt Levitt is right to point out that the genesis of the Madrid bombings remains somewhat murky, there is evidence that the attacks were more closely linked to Al Qaeda than was initially thought. The bombing operation itself was carried out by a Spanish based cell of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant group (GICM), an Al Qaeda affiliate, whose leadership built up close personal ties with Al Qaeda in the 1990s in Afghanistan. In the weeks after the Madrid attacks, Belgian police rounded up a GICM cell based in the Flemish town of Maaseik that provided key logistical support for the attacks. One of the leaders of that cell was Lahoussine el Haski, who Belgian authorities believe helped coordinate the launch of Al Qaeda's terrorist campaign in Saudi Arabia in May 2003.

Plots sponsored by terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda, the Moroccan Combatant Group or other substantially sized terrorist groups tend to have more chance of success because cell members can draw on significant financial, technical, and logistical support.

At least up till now, autonomous "self generated" cells have proven to be more amateurish than Al Qaeda and easier for security services to round up.
Home-grown cells tend not to have the sort of terrorist tradecraft or bomb-making expertise that Al Qaeda operatives develop during training in terrorist camps. Nor the same heightened sense of mission and sense of Islamic obligation that Al Qaeda can inculcate in its recruits in the mountains of North-western Pakistan.

Terrorist training often makes a large difference because it's much more difficult than is generally realized to make a bomb by downloading instructions from the Internet. To my knowledge there have not yet been any 'successful' bombings launched by jihadist-terrorists in the West, in which the plotters relied exclusively on the internet to learn how to make a bomb.

There is always the chance, though, that untrained home-grown cells could get lucky. In Europe, because it has a large Muslim community with significant numbers alienated from mainstream society, a rapid sequence of even small attacks could lead to an anti-Muslim backlash and a vicious cycle of recrimination that could have significant consequences for social cohesion and public safety. Marc Sageman's warnings about the growth of home-grown terrorism are therefore being listened to carefully in Europe.

As far as the United States is concerned, Bruce Hoffman for my money, is absolutely correct to stress that Al Qaeda Central (i.e. Al Qaeda operatives trained in Pakistan) poses the real danger. A few small 'home-grown' attacks are not going to tear apart the social fabric in the United States.

I'm going to take a different view to Matt Levitt on the importance of Bin Laden. Since he founded Al Qaeda 20 years ago, Bin Laden has been its inspirational force and key unifying figure. The latter role has been especially important. Al Qaeda's ability to launch operations of global scope depends on being able to unite different Jihadist factions and groups, but such factions have had a tendency to quarell with eachother - to disastrous effect - about even minor theological and ideological differences.

Bin Laden's capacity to inspire operatives was demonstrated by the martyrdom tape recorded by the alleged mastermind of the 2006 airlines plot Abdullah Ahmed Ali:

'Sheikh Osama warned you many times to leave our lands or you will be destroyed and now the time has come for you to be destroyed and you have nothing but to expect floods of martyr operations.'

At a time when Al Qaeda is coming under increasing criticism for its tactics from a range of other Jihadist actors, Bin Laden is arguably the one figure who has the charisma and appeal in Jihadist circles to push back. Ayman Zawahiri, for example, has nothing close to Bin Laden's appeal. Without Bin Laden, Al Qaeda may still have its camps, but there will be a leadership vacuum at the top a time when the organization is entering troubled waters.

One year ago today, members of the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of an unprecedented 27,000-strong joint UN-African Union peacekeeping mission to Darfur, Sudan (known by its acronym, UNAMID). While some critics have chosen this anniversary to focus on the slow pace at which UNAMID has deployed, recent developments give reason to think about what has been accomplished and how the UN and international community can best follow up on these gains.

After another year of humanitarian crisis, sporadic outbreaks of violence, and a crippling lack of peace, one could reasonably ask what recent developments could signal a turn for the better in Darfur. Indeed, the most significant occurrence in the past two weeks is actually something that didn't happen. In the wake of the news that the International Criminal Court (ICC) would hear evidence for the indictment of Sudanese President Bashir, many Darfur analysts feared that Khartoum's response would be to unleash a wave of coordinated military attacks. Fortunately, this has not happened. In fact, as Nicholas Kristof points out in his blog, "humanitarians have had just about their best week so far" in Darfur. This relative calm points to the likely marginalization of hardliners within Bashir's inner circle--a crucial prerequisite for peace.

And what has happened in the last two weeks that could point to accelerated progress in Darfur? For one, likely feeling the heat of international scrutiny, President Bashir deemed it prudent to pay a visit to Darfur, where he voiced support for UNAMID and pledged infrastructural improvements in the long-neglected region. These promises are merely words, of course, and the Sudanese government has a dark history of backtracking once the public spotlight moves away. The international community--particularly countries with influence on Sudan--will have to continue to press Khartoum to actually follow through with these commitments, lest its government conclude that empty promises are an adequate stand-in for real peace, security, and development.

International pressure has also begun to bear some fruit in the frustrating efforts to deploy peacekeepers to Darfur. Contingents of Chinese and Egyptian engineers have recently arrived, and Ethiopian and Egyptian troops are scheduled to join UNAMID by the end of this month. Perhaps even more significantly, long-awaited Thai and Nepalese battalions have finally been accepted by the Sudanese government. Khartoum had consistently refused the deployment of any non-African troops, so this development could signal another political shift within the regime that may bode well for further and speedier peacekeeper deployment.

What has inspired these calculated--but fragile--concessions by the Sudanese government? The continued pressure of Security Council countries is at least partially responsible. The U.S. and UK in particular have pushed for rapid UNAMID deployment, threatening targeted sanctions for continued obstruction, and even China, facing pressure of its own, has been slightly more cooperative in engaging Sudan. But the immediate impetus for Khartoum's behavior was the ICC Chief Prosecutor's decision to tighten the screws on Bashir by announcing his potential indictment. As an independent judicial institution, the ICC makes its decisions--including this one--without any consultation with the Security Council. The Security Council does retain the option of suspending ICC action for a year, however--an incentive that, at this point at least, the Sudanese government has deemed more achievable through tactical conciliation than through overt confrontation.

Even though some Sudanese officials have mouthed predictably hostile rhetoric, this bluster has not translated into actions taken on the ground. This approach is somewhat of a truism in Sudanese politics--if one hand makes conciliatory gestures, the other is obliged to aggressively wave off international interference. More troubling are the recent attacks by government forces on UN peacekeepers. These reprehensible attacks have been roundly condemned, including in a bill that recently passed the U.S. House of Representatives. However, the violence has fortunately not reached the level that some feared would be the response of a vengeful Khartoum.

Even amidst difficult conditions, and still without adequate Member State contributions of funds, manpower, or equipment, UNAMID has valiantly persevered, even taking on additional responsibilities. For instance, UNAMID has increased the number of patrols it conducts from just 271 in January to 644 in June. An ever-growing number of these patrols occur at night, providing protection for women who venture outside of the camps to collect firewood. While a recent report from African NGOs suggests that UNAMID should be doing "more with what it is," it rightly pins a large degree of responsibility on Khartoum's obstruction and the international community's failure to sufficiently equip the force.

Admittedly, the emergence of the "less bad" alternative is never a particularly firm foundation for hope. In Darfur, though, developments have far too often fallen on the "more bad" side of this spectrum. The actions of the Security Council, ICC, and UNAMID present an admittedly thin window to move toward peace in Darfur. These institutions--and more accurately, the countries that comprise and support them--should exert the pressure it takes to consolidate these gains. We cannot afford to wait another year.

The either-or nature of the question misses the point. The reality is that we face BOTH a decentralized Al Qaeda manifested by self-radicalized or homegrown "bunches of guys" for whom the al Qaeda name is just a brand or symbol AND a centralized, core al Qaeda group which is still plotting and planning attacks from the Afghan/Pakistan frontier.

As I noted earlier in this discussion thread, the threat today comes from al Qaeda core, al Qaeda affiliates, and local cells. There is much to be said of both Sageman and Hoffman's analyses, but the assumption that the core al Qaeda threat is behind us is simply belied by everything we hear from the intelligence and law enforcement communities. Recognizing the evolution toward a core group that functions as a type of symbolic leadership for a broad and decentralized movement is equally important. To date there is still no clear link between the Madrid bombers and the al Qaeda core. The link between al Qaeda and the London bombers, however, is pretty clear.

But it is also true that part of the successful evolutionary change within al Qaeda has been due to its resilience. Each time we take out an al Qaeda military commnander (Khalid Sheik Mohammed, al-Libbi, Hamza al-Ribai...) another comes along. These terrorist tacticians, however, are far more important today than Bin Laden himself. Even within the al Qaeda core leadership, it is Ayman al-Zawahiri who is the brains behind the group, as is especially evident looking at the group's media and propaganda efforts. Capturing or killing Bin Laden would be a major psychological blow to al Qaeda (and perhaps more so to the local and independent but like-minded fellow travelers), and it would be a significant accomplishment and morale booster for the Western coalition, but it would do nothing to actually harm, diminish the capabilities of or undercut support for al Qaeda. Al Qaeda today has outgrown Bin Laden.

Is Osama bin Laden still relevant? Or rather, is the threat more from a reconstituted, centralized Al Qaeda, or from more local groups radicalized by preachers or outside forces (see recent arguments between Marc Sageman and Bruce Hoffman). Also interesting to consider is how centralized Al Qaeda was before September 11, looking at the scope of its attacks both prior to and after September 11.

Which is more dangerous, a decentralized Al Qaeda operating as a symbol, or a centralized Al Qaeda still ordering attacks from a mountain redoubt?