I have, perhaps, an old-fashioned view of history and just as it is hard to explain why the French were in Moscow in 1812 without Napoleon, and the rise of the Nazi party is inextricably linked to the views and personality of Hitler, its just not possible to understand al Qaeda, what it is and what it has done, without understanding bin Laden. Without him al Qaeda simply would not exist (look at the minutes of the founding meetings of al Qaeda in 1988, for instance). Without him 9/11 would have been one of many harebrained schemes in the head of Khalid Sheik Mohammed (KSM.) The Al Qaeda organization and bin Laden the man are largely co-terminus, after all it's a rather small organization today and has always been so. The Al Qaeda movement is another matter, though that too takes its strategic cues from OBL.

Peter's is an excellent article. I'd submit, however, that it conflates Bin Laden with al Qaeda and I increasingly wonder if perhaps al Qaeda the organization has outgrown Bin Laden the man. After all, a persistent AQ threat does not mean Bin Laden is still calling the shots. Sadly, if it's true that the organization has grown past the man it is another sign of just how successful he and the organization both have been.

This is a good step:

Sierra Leonean police have adopted new policy guidelines on sexual abuse and exploitation that have been drafted by United Nations officials as part of their efforts to reduce the widespread levels of violence against women and girls in the West African country.

The policy guidelines, the first in the region, were drafted by the conduct and discipline office, the gender adviser and the UN Police section of the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), according to a statement issued in Freetown by the office on Saturday.

Considering the prevalence of sexual assault and abuse in Sierra Leone, this is a good thing to see happening. This week, UNIOSIL is conducting workshops and trainings not only for police officers, but managers and other employees of the police force. Only time will tell of the impact it will make; we can only hope it's a great one.

Some of the issues in the final discussion I tried to address in a story for TIME earlier this month, so rather than rewriting that story I'm pasting it in below:

Does Osama bin Laden matter anymore? You could be forgiven for thinking he doesn't. In recent months, an impressive cast of terrorism experts and counterterrorism officials around the world has coalesced around the notion that al-Qaeda's leader is no longer an active threat to the West. They point out that he has not been able to strike on U.S. soil since 9/11 or in Europe since the London bombings three summers ago. In Iraq, his most successful franchise operation is on the ropes. Across the Muslim world, opinion polls suggest his popularity has faded, and many of his early supporters -- including prominent jihadi ideologues -- have denounced him. Even his messages on the Internet scarcely merit headlines in the mainstream media. Did you know he posted two audio messages on the Web in May? I didn't think so.

The jihad, some experts contend, has moved beyond bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Dr. Marc Sageman, a former CIA case officer, lays out the view in his new book, Leaderless Jihad, arguing that "the present threat has evolved from a structured group of al-Qaeda masterminds controlling vast resources and issuing commands to a multitude of info rmal groups trying to emulate their predecessors by conceiving and executing operations from the bottom up. These 'homegrown' wannabes form a scattered global network, a leaderless jihad." According to this assessment, two decades since its founding in Peshawar, Pakistan, al-Qaeda remains a source of inspiration for certain extremists around the world. But it's far from clear that bin Laden commands them.

This view was shared by several European officials I met at a conference of terrorism experts in Florence in May, a few days after bin Laden's most recent Internet postings. The officials told me they've found no evidence of al-Qaeda operations in their countries. If bin Laden has any role in the jihad, say the Europeans, it is merely as an icon. Alain Grignard, Belgium's top terrorism investigator, says bin Laden is now a "Robin Hood figure; 100 people are inspired by him, but very few respond to do what he wants."

If that's true, why do so many political leaders continue to warn about the threat -- or even the likelihood -- of another major terrorist attack? Why did the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate say al-Qaeda "has protected or regenerated key elements of homeland attack capability"? Why would the head of Britain's domestic intelligence service, MI5, say there were 2,000 citizens and other U.K. residents who posed a serious threat to security, a number of whom took direction from al-Qaeda? The struggle against al Qaeda -- and to a lesser extent, the quest to capture bin Laden -- has20dominated U.S. foreign policy since 9/11.

But as the U.S. prepares to elect a new President, should that remain the case? The answers to these questions don't lend themselves to easy policy prescriptions. But the best available evidence suggests that the threat posed by bin Laden's acolytes hasn't been extinguished-- and his own influence over them is greater than many analysts acknowledge. In his old stomping grounds, the jihad is stronger than at any time since he fled from the Tora Bora mountains in the winter of 2001. The Taliban is resurgent in Afghanistan, and in Pakistan militant groups have grown so aggressive that in late June they even threatened to take over a major city -- Peshawar, once bin Laden's home and the birthplace of al-Qaeda. Farther away, extremists in Europe and North Africa continue to covet bin Laden's blessing and the al-Qaeda brand name.

As has always been true in shadowy, borderless wars, measuring the strength of the enemy isn't an exact science. It's true that many of the "leaderless jihadis" have set up operations independently of al-Qaeda, but when they turn to bin Laden's organization, it's not just for inspiration but also for training, assistance and direction -- in short, for leadership. Many are able and willing to do bin Laden's bidding; they pay very careful attention to his Internet postings and follow his instructions. And although their targets have generally been close to home, their association with al-Qaeda has tended to take their ambitions beyond their borders.

What's more, many of these homegrown wannabes live in the West. It was al-Qaeda's direct involvement that helped a leaderless group of British jihadis mount the multiple London bombings on July 7, 2005, that killed 52 commuters. Two of the bombers had traveled to Pakistan, met with al-Qaeda commanders and made martyrdom tapes with al-Qaeda's video- production arm there. A year later, British investigators uncovered a plot by another cell of British Pakistanis to bring down seven American and Canadian passenger jets. According to Lieut. General Michael Maples, head of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, the plotters received direction from al-Qaeda in Pakistan.

Bin Laden's interest in British jihadis didn't end there. Jonathan Evans, head of MI5, said last year that "over the past five years, much of the command, control and inspiration for attack-planning in the U.K. has derived from al-Qaeda's remaining core leadership in the tribal areas of Pakistan." U.S. officials, too, worry that a new generation of jihadis is making the trek to Pakistan, seeking al-Qaeda's assistance. Sixteen U.S. intelligence agencies signed off on a 2007 National Intelligence Estimate that concluded that al-Qaeda has made a strong comeback in Afghanistan and Pakistan because it has found "a safe haven in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas [FATA] in Pakistan" for its operational lieutenants and top leadership. In February, Michael McConnell, director of National Intelligence, said in congressional testimony that there had bee n an "influx of new Western recruits into the tribal areas since mid-2006." Philip Mudd, the former No. 2 in the CIA's Counterterrorism Center, who is now working at the FBI to help improve its intelligence capabilities, told me, "There is a very clear, almost mathematical increase in lethality as soon as plotters touch the FATA."

If jihadis seek material assistance from al-Qaeda in the FATA, they can get guidance from bin Laden almost anywhere there's an Internet connection. He has issued more than two dozen video- and audiotaped messages since 9/11, and some of his exhortations have been acted upon. For instance, in December 2004, bin Laden called for attacks on Saudi oil facilities; in February 2006, al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia attacked the Abqaiq facility, perhaps the most important oil-production facility in the world. (Luckily, that attack was a failure.) More recently, bin Laden has called for attacks on the Pakistani state -- there were more than 50 suicide bombings there in 2007, and there have been at least 19 thus far this year.

There's some comfort to be drawn from the fact that bin Laden has not been able to strike on U.S. soil since 9/11. There is scant evidence of al-Qaeda sleeper cells in the U.S. Thanks to more effective intelligence-gathering, immigration control and the heightened vigilance of ordinary Americans, it is very hard for terrorists to slip into the country. It's always possible that homegrown wannabes will mount some sort of attack, but in contrast to the situation in Europe, al-Qaeda's virulent ideology has found few takers in the American Muslim community.

Yet bin Laden remains determined to kill large numbers of Westerners and disrupt the global economy. Since 9/11, al-Qaeda and its affiliates have bombed Western-owned hotels around the Muslim world, attacked a number of Jewish targets and conducted suicide operations against oil facilities in the Middle East; we can expect more of the same in the future. Al-Qaeda has also used new tactics and weapons -- like the surface-to-air missile that nearly brought down an Israeli airliner in Kenya in 2002. And it retains a long-standing desire to acquire a radiological bomb. But al-Qaeda's most dangerous weapon has always been unpredictability. That's why it is dangerous to dismiss bin Laden as a spent force. While he remains at large, the jihad will never be leaderless.

Today, the Security Council is poised to re-authorize the UN-African Union Mission in Darfur. The Council had split over the issue of the International Criminal Court's potential indictment of Sudanese President Bashir, a step opposed by ICC opponents -- and Sudanese allies -- like Russia, China, Libya, and South Africa. Interestingly, though, the U.S. -- traditionally wary of the ICC, but which, along with the other 14 Council members at the time, allowed ICC jurisdiction back in March 2006 -- stood with countries like Great Britain and France in pushing for the ICC's operations in Darfur not be tied to the mandate of the peacekeeping mission there.

It appears that a compromise has been reached, and today's report will simply make note of the African Union's recent appeal for the Council to suspend ICC jurisdiction. This still leaves open the option of suspension -- pending adequate Sudanese follow-through on its commitments -- but also rightly separates the imperative of protection from the work of an independent prosecutorial body.

The renewed mandate for UNAMID comes three days after a coalition of African NGOs published a report highlighting the obstacles that the force has faced since it was turned over to UN leadership in January. While this report has been cited in some media outlets as describing the "failure" of UNAMID, its more relevant takeaway is that "the international community must have the political will to make it succeed...[and] ensure that UNAMID is given the equipment and troops it needs."

As if to underscore this point, today another report has been released, this one written by a prominent aviation expert, calling out specific countries for not offering their available helicopters to a UNAMID force that desperately needs them. The content of this report properly emphasizes the importance both of providing these helicopters and of framing the advocacy discussion in a way that identifies the specific Member States -- not, say, the UN as a whole -- responsible for not sufficiently working to improve UNAMID's performance.

Without very real contributions of these helicopters and other crucial supplies, Member States remain guilty of attempting what the former African Union chief mediator in Darfur calls "peacekeeping on the cheap." If Security Council countries are serious in their desire for UNAMID to succeed, they need not only to push for peace in Darfur -- the oxygen UNAMID needs to breath -- but to also give up the money and resources that will make it an effective protection force.

Although there have undoubtedly been more plots launched by home-grown cells in the West since 9/11 than by Al Qaeda, the evidence suggests that the most dangerous plots, such as the July 2005 London bombings and the 2006 airlines plot, have all been directed by Al Qaeda.

Although Matt Levitt is right to point out that the genesis of the Madrid bombings remains somewhat murky, there is evidence that the attacks were more closely linked to Al Qaeda than was initially thought. The bombing operation itself was carried out by a Spanish based cell of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant group (GICM), an Al Qaeda affiliate, whose leadership built up close personal ties with Al Qaeda in the 1990s in Afghanistan. In the weeks after the Madrid attacks, Belgian police rounded up a GICM cell based in the Flemish town of Maaseik that provided key logistical support for the attacks. One of the leaders of that cell was Lahoussine el Haski, who Belgian authorities believe helped coordinate the launch of Al Qaeda's terrorist campaign in Saudi Arabia in May 2003.

Plots sponsored by terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda, the Moroccan Combatant Group or other substantially sized terrorist groups tend to have more chance of success because cell members can draw on significant financial, technical, and logistical support.

At least up till now, autonomous "self generated" cells have proven to be more amateurish than Al Qaeda and easier for security services to round up.
Home-grown cells tend not to have the sort of terrorist tradecraft or bomb-making expertise that Al Qaeda operatives develop during training in terrorist camps. Nor the same heightened sense of mission and sense of Islamic obligation that Al Qaeda can inculcate in its recruits in the mountains of North-western Pakistan.

Terrorist training often makes a large difference because it's much more difficult than is generally realized to make a bomb by downloading instructions from the Internet. To my knowledge there have not yet been any 'successful' bombings launched by jihadist-terrorists in the West, in which the plotters relied exclusively on the internet to learn how to make a bomb.

There is always the chance, though, that untrained home-grown cells could get lucky. In Europe, because it has a large Muslim community with significant numbers alienated from mainstream society, a rapid sequence of even small attacks could lead to an anti-Muslim backlash and a vicious cycle of recrimination that could have significant consequences for social cohesion and public safety. Marc Sageman's warnings about the growth of home-grown terrorism are therefore being listened to carefully in Europe.

As far as the United States is concerned, Bruce Hoffman for my money, is absolutely correct to stress that Al Qaeda Central (i.e. Al Qaeda operatives trained in Pakistan) poses the real danger. A few small 'home-grown' attacks are not going to tear apart the social fabric in the United States.

I'm going to take a different view to Matt Levitt on the importance of Bin Laden. Since he founded Al Qaeda 20 years ago, Bin Laden has been its inspirational force and key unifying figure. The latter role has been especially important. Al Qaeda's ability to launch operations of global scope depends on being able to unite different Jihadist factions and groups, but such factions have had a tendency to quarell with eachother - to disastrous effect - about even minor theological and ideological differences.

Bin Laden's capacity to inspire operatives was demonstrated by the martyrdom tape recorded by the alleged mastermind of the 2006 airlines plot Abdullah Ahmed Ali:

'Sheikh Osama warned you many times to leave our lands or you will be destroyed and now the time has come for you to be destroyed and you have nothing but to expect floods of martyr operations.'

At a time when Al Qaeda is coming under increasing criticism for its tactics from a range of other Jihadist actors, Bin Laden is arguably the one figure who has the charisma and appeal in Jihadist circles to push back. Ayman Zawahiri, for example, has nothing close to Bin Laden's appeal. Without Bin Laden, Al Qaeda may still have its camps, but there will be a leadership vacuum at the top a time when the organization is entering troubled waters.

One year ago today, members of the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of an unprecedented 27,000-strong joint UN-African Union peacekeeping mission to Darfur, Sudan (known by its acronym, UNAMID). While some critics have chosen this anniversary to focus on the slow pace at which UNAMID has deployed, recent developments give reason to think about what has been accomplished and how the UN and international community can best follow up on these gains.

After another year of humanitarian crisis, sporadic outbreaks of violence, and a crippling lack of peace, one could reasonably ask what recent developments could signal a turn for the better in Darfur. Indeed, the most significant occurrence in the past two weeks is actually something that didn't happen. In the wake of the news that the International Criminal Court (ICC) would hear evidence for the indictment of Sudanese President Bashir, many Darfur analysts feared that Khartoum's response would be to unleash a wave of coordinated military attacks. Fortunately, this has not happened. In fact, as Nicholas Kristof points out in his blog, "humanitarians have had just about their best week so far" in Darfur. This relative calm points to the likely marginalization of hardliners within Bashir's inner circle--a crucial prerequisite for peace.

And what has happened in the last two weeks that could point to accelerated progress in Darfur? For one, likely feeling the heat of international scrutiny, President Bashir deemed it prudent to pay a visit to Darfur, where he voiced support for UNAMID and pledged infrastructural improvements in the long-neglected region. These promises are merely words, of course, and the Sudanese government has a dark history of backtracking once the public spotlight moves away. The international community--particularly countries with influence on Sudan--will have to continue to press Khartoum to actually follow through with these commitments, lest its government conclude that empty promises are an adequate stand-in for real peace, security, and development.

International pressure has also begun to bear some fruit in the frustrating efforts to deploy peacekeepers to Darfur. Contingents of Chinese and Egyptian engineers have recently arrived, and Ethiopian and Egyptian troops are scheduled to join UNAMID by the end of this month. Perhaps even more significantly, long-awaited Thai and Nepalese battalions have finally been accepted by the Sudanese government. Khartoum had consistently refused the deployment of any non-African troops, so this development could signal another political shift within the regime that may bode well for further and speedier peacekeeper deployment.

What has inspired these calculated--but fragile--concessions by the Sudanese government? The continued pressure of Security Council countries is at least partially responsible. The U.S. and UK in particular have pushed for rapid UNAMID deployment, threatening targeted sanctions for continued obstruction, and even China, facing pressure of its own, has been slightly more cooperative in engaging Sudan. But the immediate impetus for Khartoum's behavior was the ICC Chief Prosecutor's decision to tighten the screws on Bashir by announcing his potential indictment. As an independent judicial institution, the ICC makes its decisions--including this one--without any consultation with the Security Council. The Security Council does retain the option of suspending ICC action for a year, however--an incentive that, at this point at least, the Sudanese government has deemed more achievable through tactical conciliation than through overt confrontation.

Even though some Sudanese officials have mouthed predictably hostile rhetoric, this bluster has not translated into actions taken on the ground. This approach is somewhat of a truism in Sudanese politics--if one hand makes conciliatory gestures, the other is obliged to aggressively wave off international interference. More troubling are the recent attacks by government forces on UN peacekeepers. These reprehensible attacks have been roundly condemned, including in a bill that recently passed the U.S. House of Representatives. However, the violence has fortunately not reached the level that some feared would be the response of a vengeful Khartoum.

Even amidst difficult conditions, and still without adequate Member State contributions of funds, manpower, or equipment, UNAMID has valiantly persevered, even taking on additional responsibilities. For instance, UNAMID has increased the number of patrols it conducts from just 271 in January to 644 in June. An ever-growing number of these patrols occur at night, providing protection for women who venture outside of the camps to collect firewood. While a recent report from African NGOs suggests that UNAMID should be doing "more with what it is," it rightly pins a large degree of responsibility on Khartoum's obstruction and the international community's failure to sufficiently equip the force.

Admittedly, the emergence of the "less bad" alternative is never a particularly firm foundation for hope. In Darfur, though, developments have far too often fallen on the "more bad" side of this spectrum. The actions of the Security Council, ICC, and UNAMID present an admittedly thin window to move toward peace in Darfur. These institutions--and more accurately, the countries that comprise and support them--should exert the pressure it takes to consolidate these gains. We cannot afford to wait another year.

The either-or nature of the question misses the point. The reality is that we face BOTH a decentralized Al Qaeda manifested by self-radicalized or homegrown "bunches of guys" for whom the al Qaeda name is just a brand or symbol AND a centralized, core al Qaeda group which is still plotting and planning attacks from the Afghan/Pakistan frontier.

As I noted earlier in this discussion thread, the threat today comes from al Qaeda core, al Qaeda affiliates, and local cells. There is much to be said of both Sageman and Hoffman's analyses, but the assumption that the core al Qaeda threat is behind us is simply belied by everything we hear from the intelligence and law enforcement communities. Recognizing the evolution toward a core group that functions as a type of symbolic leadership for a broad and decentralized movement is equally important. To date there is still no clear link between the Madrid bombers and the al Qaeda core. The link between al Qaeda and the London bombers, however, is pretty clear.

But it is also true that part of the successful evolutionary change within al Qaeda has been due to its resilience. Each time we take out an al Qaeda military commnander (Khalid Sheik Mohammed, al-Libbi, Hamza al-Ribai...) another comes along. These terrorist tacticians, however, are far more important today than Bin Laden himself. Even within the al Qaeda core leadership, it is Ayman al-Zawahiri who is the brains behind the group, as is especially evident looking at the group's media and propaganda efforts. Capturing or killing Bin Laden would be a major psychological blow to al Qaeda (and perhaps more so to the local and independent but like-minded fellow travelers), and it would be a significant accomplishment and morale booster for the Western coalition, but it would do nothing to actually harm, diminish the capabilities of or undercut support for al Qaeda. Al Qaeda today has outgrown Bin Laden.

Is Osama bin Laden still relevant? Or rather, is the threat more from a reconstituted, centralized Al Qaeda, or from more local groups radicalized by preachers or outside forces (see recent arguments between Marc Sageman and Bruce Hoffman). Also interesting to consider is how centralized Al Qaeda was before September 11, looking at the scope of its attacks both prior to and after September 11.

Which is more dangerous, a decentralized Al Qaeda operating as a symbol, or a centralized Al Qaeda still ordering attacks from a mountain redoubt?

Gregory offers a thoughtful analysis and has bravely baited the rest of us to respond, so I'll take the bait. First, and just FYI, my "not unrelated" comment was intended to link energy and the economy, not the economy and terrorism.

That said, there is an interesting side note to add here, though it only underlines to my mind how the recent economic downturn in particular and economics in general is mostly unrelated to efforts to combat terrorism (the exception, of course, is the tremendous costs of fighting two wars, especially the war in Iraq, which was never truly part of the poorly phrased war on terror). That is, al Qaeda has been extremely effective at conducting economic warfare -- al Qaeda has expended relatively little treasure to inflict on the U.S. and the West in general exorbitant costs. Look to senior al Qaeda leaders' statements to underscore that this is part of their strategy. Consider also the recent case in Canada involving Monin Khawaja, who reportedly wrote in a 2003 email, "So we have to come up with a way that we can drain their economy of all its resources, cripple their industries, and bankrupt their systems in place, all so that they are forced to withdraw their troops, so they cannot afford to go to war.... We need constant economic j[ihad], blow after blow, until they cripple and fall, never to rise again." In that, despite the costs we have incurred (some unnecessarily), I submit that have and will continue to fail - but there is that connection in terms of their intent.

Gregory agrees that terrorism "is very important indeed and requires continued
maximal vigilance and sustained attention." So the fact that al Qaeda has failed to conquer territory, while telling and a sign of its inherent bankrupt ideology, really doesn't mitigate the threat it poses to America and its allies. And taking our allies into account is critical. Al Qaeda affiliates in North Africa, for example, may pose less of a threat to the U.S. but it is the primary threat facing our allies in much of Europe, particularly France, Spain and Italy. Giving our transatlantic relationships greater attention is not well-served by playing down the threats posed by al Qaeda's regional affiliates. And as to the homegrown threat, the New York Police Department's study should be a wake-up call to us all -- the radicalization Peter and I have discussed in the UK context may well be happening in parts of the United States as well.

Gregory and I apparently disagree over the seriousness of the threat posed by Iran -- that's an important debate but a different one that the one we're having now so I'll leave that for another time. But should terrorism continue to be the - or one of the - "premier national security priorities" of the next administration (the questions we've been asked to address here)? Yes. Gregory's musing whether it is also the "defining challenge of the 21st Century" is in fact a totally different question. I submit that if we give the issue the attention it needs now there is no reason it should be "the defining issue" when historians later look back at the 21st Century.

Finally, Gregory makes an important point when he highlights the growing importance of Russia, China, and India, among other states, to which we need to give greater attention. The next administration will need to walk and chew gum at the same time, focusing on counterterrorism while balancing not only other priority issues and countries but even sometimes competing foreign policy interests, as we've discussed earlier regarding, for example, the democracy agenda, Arab reform, combating AIDS/HIV in Africa, etc. We'll need to deal with all these critical issues, and fix the economy and the housing market and plenty of other things at home, but combating terrorism will remain a priority for at least the next four years, so yes: it deserves to be at the very top of the next administration's priority list.

Before we fall into a consensus that terrorism remains at (or very near) the top of the heap, permit me to play contrarian among these terrorism experts.

Matt advises we face a "three-fold threat", namely: 1) core al-Q, 2) 'franchise' players like al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and 3) a motley gaggle of some 300 groups (most of them Sunni, reportedly) that have "less direct ties to al-Qaeda", per Matt.

Let us take each in turn, if very briefly. Core Al Qaeda now sequestered in Pakistan, in the main, hasn't even been able to overturn the Pakistani Government, let alone materially threaten ours, at least not since the traumatic events of 9/11, getting on a decade ago. They threaten important cities like Peshawar in the North West Frontier Province, a shocking and worrisome fact, but not yet the central government in Islamabad, despite high profile assassinations like Benazir Bhutto's.

Regional al Qaeda affiliates of late, I'd argue particularly in the Maghreb, are gaining steam. A recent prominent attack on U.N. interests in Algiers is of concern, but again, I fail to see how these groups present a vital threat to these United States. An important one, yes (certainly in the context that they also happen to present a more direct threat to close European allies like Spain and Italy, say), but the primary one? I don't think so.

Then we turn to Matt's listing of some 300 terror groups we need be concerned about! But a brief perusal of Matt's linked National Counterterrorism Center document shows many of the incidents occurring in such forlorn spots as Chad, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and dozens of course, in Iraq (there were far fewer there, indeed none, before our invasion, it bears noting, if it's become tiresome to do so). Again, I query, is this the maximal primary U.S. foreign policy threat we will be confronting going forward?

Matt, to his credit (after an obligatory reference to the Iranian threat, itself overblown, as General Abizaid and other have noted even a nuclear Iran could very likely be contained--and this without necessarily setting off an arms race with Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and others going nuclear) does mention sky-rocketing energy prices (despite recent down moves in oil it remains exorbitant), as well as the "not-unrelated issues" of the U.S. economy.

Forgive me for saying it, but the capsizing depression in the U.S. housing market, highly worrisome food and energy inflation, massive credit crisis to which bulge brackets banks have been brutally buffeted since July '07, and generally dismal economic milieu (which I believe very likely to get worse, with more regional banks very likely failing shortly) I would suspect is rather unrelated to al-Qaeda and terrorism, with few exceptions like Nigerian militants on occasion impacting oil prices after successful attacks, or the "geopolitical risk premium" as tensions with Iran wax and wane impacting oil prices as well. I take the time to differentiate our economic turmoil from the terror threat as too often terrorism has served as an all-purpose boogey-man these past years, and I think this thinking deeply flawed with unfavorable ramifications for our policy-making process.

Eric in turn, while mostly agreeing with Matt that terrorism must be a "high priority" (re: which I don't necessarily disagree, but we must be less skittish to name others too) wisely suggests sucking out some of the excess from the anti-terror mantle brandished about with crusader-like zeal by too many in the Beltway. In this I couldn't agree more with his "1" through "5" below.

And yet, nowhere in this discussion do we mention our tottering relations with great powers like Russia, where our policy has veered into incoherence as Putin has effectively reversed democratization there in favor of some variant of state-oligarch-driven capitalist autocracy, as we dilly-dally over missile defense systems on their western borders that are, all told, likely not even necessary, but certainly hugely concerning to the Russians. Nowhere in this discussion do we broach the massive challenges posed by a rising China, whether integrating them better into the international economic system, digesting the implications of the largest rural migration into cities I think in history, the environmental challenges China presents to itself, the region and indeed the world, or even, the fact that new political and economic architecture is being cobbled together in the Pacific Rim, too often with not enough U.S. involvement (despite Chris Hill's laudable efforts on North Korea, of which the boos and hisses only crescendoed the closer he came to success, discrediting the arrayed neoconservative nomenklatura disgruntled that diplomats dare deign do their jobs).

Nowhere either is there talk of the future of our relationship with India, where even at this late hour it is far from certain, indeed likelier not, that an agreement on the nuclear issue between Delhi and Washington will be agreed. Nowhere either do we highlight the critical imperative of resuscitating the scandalously moribund Arab-Israeli peace process, which despite the cheap theater of Annapolis, seems to have been sub-contracted out of late--via a combination of gross amateurism and neglect--to countries like France, Turkey and, say, Qatar. Nor even do we mention but perhaps in passing the pressing need for a Manhattan Project on energy, for greater movement on climate change, for our neglected relations with Central and Sough America (notably that rising BRIC Brazil), or the devastation being wrought through Africa via ongoing chronic conflicts and disease. I could go on, but these challenges matter too, do the not?

We are a great power (yes, still), and there are more than Sunni terror groups to be concerned about on the world stage. Our national psyche was profoundly wounded after 9/11, and understandably so, but I fear we have stumbled into an age of gross paranoia and incompetence, myopically focused on one single threat we deem the existential one of the age, while around us critical relationships/issues flounder because of abject neglect. This is a sad testament I believe to a foreign policy elite that has lost its moorings, and is in critical need of fresh thinking. Perhaps hope beckons with a new Administration incoming, though I've learned these past years to restrain my optimism.

Anyway, excuse the quasi-rant, as well as the length of this missive, and consider this a provocation to our group about question prompt 3, keeping in mind I certainly don't believe terrorism to be an un-important issue, it is very important indeed and requires continued maximal vigilance and sustained attention, but am flagging for discussion whether it is really the defining challenge of the 21st Century, say, which we seem to hear too often in think-tank conclaves, or on the campaign trail.

When we last reported the status of the United Nations Mission to Ethiopia-Eritrea (UNMEE), we cited intelligence that the mission, facing the expiration of its mandate on July 31, could be transformed into a smaller observer contingent. Now it appears that even that option is off the table, and that the mission will be closed down entirely.

The U.N. Security Council voted on Wednesday to disband its peacekeeping mission to the volatile border between Eritrea and Ethiopia after Eritrea forced out most of the U.N. troops. The mandate for the 1,700-strong force expires on Thursday. The council unanimously approved a resolution drafted by Belgium that calls for the mission to be terminated and all peacekeeping personnel to be withdrawn.

On one hand, the disbanding of UNMEE--without even a compromise force to replace it--is unfortunate, as it leaves an already tense border region with no objective peacekeeping presence whatsoever. While Ethiopia and Eritrea are not technically at war, their armies, according to the International Crisis Group, are "less than a football pitch" apart in certain areas.

More realistically, though, sending peacekeepers home from Ethiopia-Eritrea simply makes official what had been a de facto termination of the mission since Eritrea decided to deprive it of necessary fuel supplies. The all-important "peace to keep" for UNMEE was little more than ostensible, as both sides -- Eritrea through this denial of fuel, Ethiopia by continuing to place troops in an area that an international border commission awarded to Eritrea -- have recklessly flouted UN authority and hampered the mission's effectiveness.

UN peacekeepers cannot be expected to stand between two armies and prevent the return of full-scale war. If Ethiopia and Eritrea are serious about resolving their dispute, they will have to work out -- and abide by -- their own peace agreements. Leaving UNMEE there without a corresponding level of commitment from both sides only encourages the unreasonable expectation that peacekeepers alone will be able to defuse this crisis.

I agree with Matt Levitt and others that tackling the threat of Al Qaeda terrorism should remain a top-tier national security priority. In the coming decades more significant challenges will no doubt emerge, most important of which will be managing the rise of China. And in the nearer term the Iran nuclear standoff will continue to loom large.

But Al Qaeda, impossible to deter like Iran, should still top the next President's national security briefings. As others have pointed out, Al Qaeda has regenerated its ability to attack the United States from its training camps in Pakistan. There was no greater demonstration of this than a plot thwarted here in London in August 2006 to bring down up to seven commercial airliners en route to North America. The trial, which I've been attending, has revealed that the alleged plotters were trained in Pakistan in how to make explosive devices, and had assembled all the materials necessary to manufacture bombs that would have been undetectable by airport security.

British officials believe the plan may have been to explode the planes over American cities. Seven 'Lockerbie' type events over New York, Washington DC, San Francisco, Chicago and other densely populated North American metropolises would likely have produced a death toll larger than 9/11. If the plot had been successful, one can only imagine the impact it would have had on the global aviation industry, the U.S. economy, and the international financial system.

Unfortunately as long as Al Qaeda is able to train recruits with relative impunity in north-western Pakistan, it will remain a strategic threat to the United States.

New airport security regulations have made launching an attack on airliners more difficult, but there are still a range of attack scenarios that could cause significant damage the United States. While it is extremely unlikely that Al Qaeda could get hold of a nuclear weapon, it may more realistically be able to deploy a radiological device (or 'dirty bomb') in a U.S. city. Although such a device (essentially conventional explosives packed with radioactive materials) would cause less fatalities than sometimes speculated - with the danger to public health limited to about a city block -it could create tremendous public fear.

The next U.S administration should not, therefore, downgrade tackling the Al Qaeda terrorist threat as a national security priority. But resources should certainly be better allocated. Money spent on improving intelligence and law enforcement capabilities delivers much greater security gains per dollar than money lavished on border security fences or expensive scanners to screen container shipments for radioactive devices. That is not to say that resources should not be allocated to such defenses but given the dozens of ways Al Qaeda could get round them, the United States should steer clear of a Maginot mentality. As the title of a new book by former NYPD Counter-terrorism Commissioner Michael Sheehan makes clear, the priority should always be to 'Crush the Cell.'

Will Al Qaeda's still be the top national security priority in a decade? Much will depend on whether the Pakistani government wakes up to the threat posed by Al Qaeda in the tribal areas of the country. But there are some grounds for believing that Al Qaeda will be a lesser force in ten years. As Peter Bergen and I reported recently in the New Republic, there is an emerging backlash against Al Qaeda in Muslim countries, a function of it killing so many Muslims in recent years and so nakedly targeting western civilians.

A pattern has emerged, most visibly in Iraq but also now in the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan, that when Al Qaeda's brand of violence comes to people's doorsteps, sympathy for the terrorists dramatically decreases. Furthermore, leading Jihadists, with clout amongst Al Qaeda's target audience of radical-leaning youngsters, have started to publicly articulate the differences between 'legitimate' Jihad and Al Qaeda's campaign of terrorism.

The fact that Al Qaeda may be starting to self-implode has, I think, some implications for the second discussion prompt on the degree to which the U.S. military should be employed in combating terrorism. While given the current local dynamics, there are strong arguments for boosting U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan, and maintaining a residual number of troops in Iraq, there should be strong restraint in deploying the military in other arenas. The last thing the United States should grant Al Qaeda, when it is facing so much criticism from within the Jihadist movement, is another 'cause celebre.' Without the recruiting boost provided by the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Al Qaeda, an organization on the ropes in 2002, would have been significantly less of a threat than it is today.

From the UN News Center:

A new United Nations assessment has found that millions of people in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) are experiencing the worst food crisis in almost a decade, owing to successive poor harvests coupled with soaring food prices.

"Millions of vulnerable North Koreans are at risk of slipping towards precarious hunger levels," Jean-Pierre de Margerie, Country Director for the UN World Food Programme (WFP) tolda news conference in Beijing today.

"The last time hunger was so deep and so widespread in parts of the country was in the late 1990s," he added.

(Image from UN News Center)

As Matt indicates, the threats are real and potentially catastrophic should AQ or its affiliates get a hold of weapons of mass destruction. The issue for me is less the high priority being placed on countering the threat than the manner in which we are countering it:

1) too much emphasis on and too prominent a role for the military; 2) the tendency to try to impose counterterrorism as a priority in countries (particularly in Africa) where the governments and people are faced with much more pressing threats from HIV/AIDS, poverty, corruption, organized and other forms of crime, and lack of development; 3) the tendency to want to put a "counterterrorism" label on policy initiatives (e.g., related to education, development, the training of law enforcement officials) in countries where doing so may lead to resistance on the ground and thus be counterproductive to actually countering terrorism; 4) the continuing pattern of exaggerating the extent of the al Qaida connections with what may be local insurgencies, for example in Indonesia and The Philippines, and where labeling such insurgencies as al Qaeda-related may magnify the profile of smaller unrelated groups or stifle attempts to address the local grievances that are motivating the insurgencies (See, e.g., Amitav Acharya and Arabinda Acharya, "The Myth of the Second Front: Localizing the "War on Terror" in Southeast Asia," Washington Quarterly, Autumn 2007); and 5) the failure to build the alliances and strengthen international cooperation with traditional and non-traditional partners around the world.

Thus, what is needed is not a de-emphasis in terrorism relative to other national priorities but a more nuanced and less blunt notion of what we mean by "counter" terrorism, taking into account the five concerns/limitations I have outlined. I am sure I have left out many others that need to be taken into account as well and look forward to others adding to this list!

I do not think we are concentrating too much on terrorism, it legitimately belongs at the very top of the list of national security threats we face today. True, the nature of the transnational threats facing the world today is far different than the ones the U.S. and its allies faced on 9/11. But al-Qaeda itself remains a formidable opponent, with a resurgent core in Northwest Pakistan and affiliates and homegrown cells pose a growing threat as well.

Today, the US and its allies face a three fold threat. The first is from core al Qaeda. While al Qaeda was on its "back foot" from 2004-2007, it has now "regained its equilibrium," according to DHS Undersecretary Charlie Allen. NCTC Director Michael Leiter echoed this, warning that "I regret to say that the Al Qaeda threat still looms large." Deputy DNI Donald Kerr offered a similar assessment, stating that "Al Qaeda remains the preeminent terror threat to the United States at home and abroad." There are several reasons, in Dr. Kerr's view, why core al Qaeda continues to pose such a serious threat to the US. The group has "retained or regenerated key elements of its capability, including its top leadership, operational lieutenants, and a de facto safe haven in...the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to train and deploy operatives for attacks in the West." Al Qaeda has successfully expanded its reach with partnerships with other organizations throughout the Middle East and North Africa, which Dailey referred to as the "franchising of al Qaeda." These affiliates include al Qaeda in Iraq, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. Finally, there are today more local groups with less direct ties to al Qaeda. According to the National Counterterrorism Center, there were almost 300 different groups involved in terrorist attacks in 2006 - most of them Sunni. In fact, according to the State Department, the terrorist threat has been transformed to the point that it now is a "form of global insurgency."

That said, and harking back to an earlier portion of this discussion, Ido think it is critical that we leverage all elements of national power to combat this threat at both tactical (thwarting plots) and strategic (engaging in the battle of ideas) levels. It is also true that our focus on the terrorist threat has come at the expense of other important national security priorities, including promoting Arab reform, empowering Arab democrats, and more. Sadly, that did not have to be the case and rectify this imbalance will be a priority for whoever next occupies the White House.

Finally, other issues are creeping up immediate national security threats even as the terrorist threat remains. Consider, for example, the not-unrelated issues of the price of oil, the larger energy crisis, and the state of the economy. But Iran is likely to be the most critical national security threat facing the next administration. The possibility that Iran could reach the point of nuclear weapon self-sufficiency and be able to produce and nuclear weapon to go with its existing ballistic missile delivery systems within the term of the next administration will force this issue even further onto the font burner than it has been over the past few years.

Is there a chance that we are concentrating too much on terrorism? If so, how have some of the policy trade-offs manifested themselves? Should the next president de-emphasize terrorism relative to other national security priorities?

Like Mediterranean food? So do people in Mediterranean countries. More and more of it these days. And, increasingly, according to a recent UN Food and Agriculture Organization study, lots of other, not-so-healthy foods as well. From the UN News Centre:

People on the shores of the Mediterranean have used higher incomes to add a large number of calories from meat and fats to a diet that was traditionally light on animal proteins. What they now eat is "too fat, too salty and too sweet," [FAO Senior Economist Josef] Schmidhuber reports.

In the 40 years to 2002, daily intake in 15 European nations increased from 2,960 kilocalories to 3,340 kilocalories - about 20 per cent. But Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Cyprus and Malta, who started out poorer than the northerners, upped their calorie count by 30 per cent.

Improving economies certainly explain part of this story, as the tendency of people with more disposable income to want to eat more meat is part of a global trend -- one that, particularly in China, is contributing to rising food prices and environmental degradation. As the study soberly points out, though, high levels of obesity are also caused by people eating more and exercising less. Go figure.

(Photo by Flickr user hazy jenius used under a Creative Commons license.)

Thanks, Matt, for following this thread.

On the definition issue, at risk of stating the obvious, the distinction between "terrorists" and "freedom fighters" is given weight it doesn't deserve because of the inherently political nature of any discussion of who is and who isn't a terrorist. The fact that the US only recently took Nelson Mandela off of its terrorist list is a reminder of this.

I don't think it's realistic to expect one to divorce the politics from the law here, particularly in the context of efforts to reach agreement among the diversity of countries within the UN. It's worth noting that many sitting governments in sub-saharan Africa (and elsewhere) saw themselves as "freedom fighters" (and were often labeled by Western governments as "terrorists") when they fought to "overthrow" the colonial regimes that had been in place.

Thus, to the extent there is any hope to finally reach agreement on a global definition of terrorism, the task can't be left to the lawyers (I was one of them!) to try to resolve the differences in the draft UN comprehensive convention on international terrorism that has been in play for some years now. Instead, high-level political engagement is needed. This needs to come from the UN Secretary-General, the US President, and leaders from key Islamic and African countries. Finding a way to get President Abbas to come to the UN General Assembly and condemn all indiscriminate attacks against civilians carried out for political purposes, even if committed by Palestinian "freedom fighters", for example, would be an important first step.

On Matt's 1267 Committee point, the issue is a bit more complicated. For example, it's worth recalling that the US was one of the loudest critics of the Monitoring Group that was disbanded in 2004. In fact, the US lead the charge in the UNSC to not renew the mandate. Much of the criticism had to do with the occasional failure of the group to stay within it its mandate and back up its often pointed assertions in its reports with the necessary factual support.

As for whether the UNSC should establish an independent panel, this is something that I hope to address in a broader discussion of the UN's role in CT, which I hope will be prompted.

What's the problem we're trying to solve seems to be the topic of the day here. It is a question almost everyone who works at a company, foundation, or association (the funders) seems to be asking (including me), and it has been hard for the NGO participants to come to any agreement on the answer.

So, thankfully, Mitul and Claire (representing the UN Foundation's Technology Partnership) worked with the facilitators to restructure our agenda, break into smaller working groups and try a project-based approach to answer that question. By focusing the conversation on how you use technology to tackle problems related to community health or what the end goal of better data collection is or how to take projects to scale, we now have four excited and re-energized groups (instead of one larger, slightly cranky one).

Each group worked together for about two hours today and will work together again tomorrow before reporting back to the larger group about the problem they're addressing, the technology solution, and then how they involve others (including the United Nations) in their work.

I think two things they heard today will also help them focus their plans. Dave Sessions of Microsoft walked everyone through the basic elements of a successful business plan (including know your audience, know what you're trying to do, know how you're unique or bring value to the solution, etc.).

Gautam Ivatury from CGAP and Jessie Moore from the GSM Association also helped the group better understand mobile banking and how the lessons learned developing a mobile banking application for the "unbanked" in the developing world might be applied to mHealth. Known as MPesa, it started with 2,000 users but now more than 2 million people use it to do things I do at an ATM, including transfer money, check balances, pay bills, etc. And all using a mobile phone and text.

How did they do it? By including partners from all the different sectors including mobile phone providers, handset operators, banks, and customers, as well as organizations outside of the banking industry including the World Bank and The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. One person was skeptical and asked how a commercial product, developed by a for-profit industry, could be used to create greater social change. The response: helping create a financially literate community and empowering people to control their own money would help free them from poverty. It will take time but was a strong reminder of how powerful a long-term, audacious goal can be supported by smaller but really innovative projects.

This morning Kate Sheppard posted a great succinct analysis on what the U.S. Congress may do on energy legislation before recess:

The "biggest opportunity" to pass energy legislation, Bingaman said, is the tax-credit extensions for renewable energy that have stalled repeatedly in the Senate, despite passing in the House on multiple occasions. GOP senators haven't liked the Democrats' proposals to pay for the tax credits by closing what Democrats consider to be tax loopholes for business, but moderate Democrats have insisted that so-called "pay-fors" are necessary to prevent the bill from adding to the budget deficit.

A new compromise version of the bill, proposed by Senate Finance Committee Chair Max Baucus (D-Mont.), would pay for the extension of tax credits by setting limits on the ability of hedge-fund managers to defer taxes on their income held offshore and by putting off until 2019 a tax credit for multinational corporations. Baucus also added a number of unrelated provisions meant to make the bill more attractive to Republicans. It's unclear how many Republicans might be willing to back Baucus' proposal.

Renewable-energy companies have been howling that failure to extend the tax credits is crippling them.

Kate's got it right, particularly the last line. Boom/bust cycles in the tax code have been truly damaging to the renewables sector and are one of the reasons why the U.S. lags behind its European counterparts and why most of these companies are headquartered abroad.

In general, uncertain and erratic policies increase the cost of capital, meaning that one must pay a higher rate to equity providers or lenders if one cannot count on supportive policies in cash flow projections. In a burgeoning and nascent industry, like the renewable energy industry, which works on tight margins, it can be devastating. For example, in 2001 and 2002, a two-month gap between the expiration and renewal of these vital credits resulted in a four-fold decline in new wind capacity.

The consequences of a failure to act now by the Congress could be even worse, possibly sparking the loss of more than than 116,000 jobs and $19 billion in investment in 2009 in the solar and wind energy industries alone. Conversely, passing all of these tax provisions soon will help to prevent the cancellation of 42,000 MW of planned renewable energy projects in development today in 45 states -- an amount equivalent to 75 baseload electric power stations.

Eric raises excellent points. I'll just add that on top of the question of whether the existing treaties do in fact cover the full waterfront on possible terrorist offenses, the lack of a common definition of terrorism has several other implications. Among them:

First, much of the debate over terrorism still focuses on the groups themselves and their underlying grievances or political objectives, not the actual acts of terrorism - the criminal terrorist offenses - they carry out. As such, the "terrorism v resistance" argument is given weight it does not deserve since the legal issue at hand is not why one carries out a criminal act of terrorism like a suicide bombing but the fact that such an act was carried out at all.

Second, the 1267 committee is only authorized to deal with al Qaeda and the Taliban, so all other groups -- from Hamas and Hezbollah to FARC and ETA to Kach and Kahane Chai -- can only be designated unilaterally by individual countries or by regional bodies like the EU. This too is a factor of the lack of a common definition of terrorism.

Finally, on a somewhat tangential note, the U.N. should re-establish an independent monitoring group not under the thumb of the Security Council, as my colleague Mike Jacobson has argued In January 2004, the United Nations replaced the monitoring group with a team with far less autonomy after some member states complained that its reports were too critical. The monitoring team has done excellent work, and should be given full and free reign to accomplish its important Mission.

By Katherine Miller, Executive Director of Communications at the UN Foundation

The United Nations Foundation and Vodafone Group Foundation, in cooperation with the Rockefeller Foundation, is hosting a four-day conference to explore an emerging trend, mHealth, that harnesses mobile communications technologies to tackle global health care issues. Around the table are many of the world's recognized leaders in this field (along with some of the biggest funders) and if this first day of conversation is any indication of what's to come, it's going to be an interesting and informative discussion.

Represented at the meeting are public health systems, technology companies, major f