An editorial in Kenya's Daily Nation thinks that the international community's response to the pirate crisis has been too focused on a military solution.

[I]nstead of sabre-rattling in a situation as fraught with danger as this, maybe the United Nations should be thinking of employing the services of negotiators skilled in the art of handling hostage situations.

The United Nations has passed two resolutions authorizing countries to use naval force to combat piracy. And NATO is ready to comply, agreeing to send its warships to join those of the United States and Russia off the coast of Somalia. But this does not mean that international organizations are not engaged in negotiations. In fact, it's been negotiations that have resulted in the potential ransom deal with the Ukrainian ship and today's release of a Japanese ship that pirates had seized.

The Daily Nation's broader point, though, is valid; the response to lawless bandits marauding cargo and passenger ships with impunity will require a significant commitment and reorientation of strategy. One key process, as I argued here, is connecting the anarchy at sea to the anarchy on the ground. This means seriously delving into the messy and difficult realities of Somali politics and working to forge a government that enjoys widespread legitimacy and can both protect its civilians and control the terrorist threat on and offshore.

Preparing a military component to an international anti-piracy strategy, in short, by no means precludes other, equally important initiatives. I do believe, though, that dealing with such intransigent law-breakers -- not to mention simply protecting ships and humanitarian aid convoys -- requires the mobilization of naval resources. And plus, the pirates still seem to have eyes for nothing but the money.

(Image from flickr user Ligadier Truffaut using a Creative Commons license)

When I cited international reports that had laid eyes on the cargo manifest of the Ukrainian ship hijacked by pirates en route to Kenya South Sudan, I was confident that the documentation told the whole story. However, the Kenyan government -- which obviously does not want to be seen as undermining a peace between North and South Sudan that it helped mediate -- seems to have staked its defense on the meaning of four little letters on this potentially damning piece of evidence. The Economist raises this possibility that I had not considered:

Much will turn on the real meaning of the acronym GOSS, evident as the buyer on the manifest. Most people take this to mean the Government of South Sudan, meaning that the tanks were destined for that region. The Kenyans say it means the Kenyan army's own General Ordinance Supplies and Security, proving that the tanks were going to Kenya.

My guess is that the tanks were in fact headed to Sudan -- yet it does seem amazingly coincidental that the Kenyan army does in fact have an organization with the initials GOSS. We can be sure, though, that the pirates currently holding onto the cargo were not intended to be the ultimate recipients.

(cross-posted at On Day One)

Via Chris Borgen at Opinio Juris, it seems that Republican Vice Presidential candidate Sarah Palin, as Governor of Alaska, has supported the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a treaty that has struggled to overcome opposition in the U.S. Senate for years.

From Palin's position governing a state on the Arctic, this support makes sense. Ratifying the Law of the Sea treaty -- which a broad swath of American legislators, on the left and the right, have endorsed, and 155 countries across the world have adopted -- would put the United States back in the game of staking and negotiating claims on vital ocean territory up North.

Fully adopting UNCLOS is, to be blunt, a no-brainer. In addition to the increased access to the ocean's resources that it would grant the United States, it would protect a threatened environment, enhance oil production, and further U.S. military interests -- benefits that have created a diverse coalition of supporters among environmentalist, oil companies, and the U.S. Navy. Due to a stock of unfortunately durable myths, though, the treaty has been stalled for over 20 years. The Better World Campaign offers an excellent run-down of these myths and their clarifications, but an equally strong defense comes directly from Governor Palin, as quoted by Chris.

[R]atification has been thwarted by a small group of senators concerned about the perceived loss of U.S. sovereignty. I believe quite the contrary is the case. If the U.S. does not ratify the convention, we will be denied access to the forum established by the international community to adjudicate claims to submerged lands in the arctic.

What also makes Palin's support curious is the rather ambiguous position of her running mate, John McCain. McCain was long an earnest advocate for Law of the Sea, but he seems to have taken both sides of the issue over the course of the past year or so.

Far more than expertise on Russia, an understanding of the benefits of the Law of the Sea treaty would be a tangible addition that Governor Palin will hopefully bring to the GOP ticket.

Things like nation-building, security sector reform, conflict stabilization, and peacekeeping have not traditionally been the primary focus of the United States military. Despite having the largest and most technologically advanced armed forces in the world, the United States, for example, contributes only 319 uniformed personnel (including just nine troops) to United Nations peacekeeping missions. Facing roiling insurgencies and state failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, though, the United States has gotten better at it -- it's had to.

The rise of the "Petraeus Doctrine" and the counterinsurgency manual that he helped write has led to a reorientation of America's military strategy. Yesterday, no less a figure than the Commanding General of the U.S. Army at Ft. Leavenworth, attested to this shift in focus with the unveiling of a document that is equally revolutionary -- despite its rather unimposing title, "Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations." The impact of this Field Manual comes in its recognition, for the first time in the Army's history, that so-called "stability operations" -- the somewhat less "sexy," but perhaps even more important in the long-term, consideration of how to stabilize a situation after a war -- should be given the same priority as traditional war-fighting capabilities.

Included in this reinvigorated emphasis on post-conflict operations is the need for the United States to interact with, contribute to, and learn from international organizations. Not surprisingly, the UN gets some serious love here. Check out these snippets from the Army's new Field Manual:

Multilateral missions with the broad approval of the international community have a higher degree of legitimacy than unilateral missions. These might include missions conducted by a coalition under a United Nations' mandate.

...

The UN brings high levels of legitimacy, unique capabilities provided by a broad mix of member states, and a capacity for sustaining large missions over long periods. It deploys many agencies capable of supporting [security sector reform] efforts across all three elements of the security sector.

...

Building close working relationships with international partner nations and organizations enhances the effectiveness of reconstruction and stabilization operations. These organizations range from the United Nations and European Union to partner countries like the United Kingdom and Canada.

The key, of course, will be implementing these recommendations. There are many concrete ways that the United States can increase its support to the United Nations -- from contributing more resources and personnel to paying back its dues to recommitting to diplomacy with the rest of the world. It is a good sign that the far more lavishly funded Department of Defense is joining the State Department in retooling the U.S.-UN relationship. The proof, though, as they say, is in the pudding -- and effective stability operations can be quite the pudding.