The diplomacy between the United States and North Korea -- which saw the former "delist" the latter as a state sponsor of terror in exchange for stronger assurances that Pyongyang was halting its nuclear program -- has already resulted in increased access for the UN's nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency. From State Department spokesman Sean McCormack:

"I understand that the IAEA has resumed its work. It has started to reapply seals," he told reporters.

"I think, as simply put, the North Koreans have started the reversal of their reversal, so they're getting back to that baseline where they were very close to meeting their obligations under the second phase that we're in, in terms of disablement" of North Korea's nuclear complex, he said.

Just to be clear, a "reversal of [a] reversal" is a very good thing when it means dismantling, instead of developing, nuclear weapons.

(Image from flickr user nickwheeleroz under a Creative Commons license.)

Word is, the president will take North Korea off the list of state sponsors of terror as early as today. The Washington Post reports that this move comes on the heels of threats by North Korea to re-start its nuclear facility at Yongbyon, where International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors were barred from entering earlier in the week.

Meanwhile, the Secretary General released a new report on the human rights situation in the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea.

Although their veracity could not be independently confirmed, reports from a range of sources continue to cite a high number of public executions. There is allegedly a crackdown on petty economic criminals, whose number has increased owing to the current serious food shortages and difficult living conditions, which have also led to an increase in the number of kkotjebi (homeless children). When forcibly repatriated, nationals who had left the country without State permission continue to face interrogation, mistreatment and sometimes torture, followed by imprisonment and forced labour. Punishment for the family members of defectors has reportedly been used as a deterrent to prevent defection. There have been continued accounts of prisoners being subjected to forced labour, ideological rehabilitation and sometimes torture, many of whom allegedly suffer from malnutrition and chronic diseases. Female prisoners are allegedly subjected to sexual assault and forced abortion. The trafficking of women for the purposes of prostitution and forced marriage also continues to be reported. (emphasis mine)

This probably should not come as a surprise, but it is very disturbing nonetheless. And it is probably fair to say that these kinds of abuses will continue regardless of North Korea's nuclear status or whether or not it is on a State Department list of state sponsors of terror.

UPDATE: "No decision has been taken yet," says a State Department spokesperson on the question of removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terror. Consultations with the Russian Foreign Minister are pending.

For the second consecutive debate, John McCain responded to a question about a possible Iranian threat by referring to the shadowy concept of a "league of democracies."

I think, joining with our allies and friends in a league of democracies, that we can effectively abridge [Iran's] behavior, and hopefully they would abandon this quest that they are on for nuclear weapons.

There are two parts to this proposed solution: "joining" the hypothetical league, and "effectively abridg[ing]" Iran's nuclear program. The problem with the first step in this process is that the "League of Democracies" is in fact hypothetical. It does not exist, and, as just about every other proposed member country will tell you, it has very little prospect of actually coming to fruition.

Even if a coalition of "democratic" countries could somehow be cobbled together, proposing this measure as the solution to the Iranian threat would dangerously delay -- and ultimately undermine -- global efforts to "effectively abridge" Iran's nuclear program. Creating a "League of Democracies" to deter Iran's nuclear ambitions is not just a risky endeavor, because of the lack of international enthusiasm for the idea; even if one could muster enough international consensus to begin the process, it would be a time-consuming project, one for which the United States cannot afford to expend its efforts, particularly when Iran's progress toward nuclear weapons is as dangerous as both candidates agree that it is.

Before referencing the League of Democracies last night, Senator McCain stressed the importance of "joining with our allies, imposing significant, tough sanctions to modify [Iran's] behavior." This is absolutely correct. The thing is, it will not require the construction of a new, unpopular, and only hazily sketched out organization to undertake this policy. Working with our allies through the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency -- institutions that our allies have already signed onto and are supportive of -- will prove both more feasible and more immediate than the stepwise process of rounding up select countries into what would very likely end up being a weak mechanism for exerting pressure on Iran.

Supporters of a League of Democracies argue that it would be more effective at halting Iranian nuclear activity for principally two reasons: it would somehow harness the powers of democratic-minded states opposed to a nuclear-armed Iran, and it would avoid the threat of a Russian or Chinese veto on the Security Council. Both of these quickly turn out to be misguided. First, as Mark points out, the group currently taking the lead on the Iran issue is in fact a collection of democracies, and the same countries that, one assumes, would be invited -- and would likely decline -- to join a "League of Democracies" are all already active in these efforts.

As for the threat of a spoiler country vetoing tough action, here the relatively simple maxim of "a country's domestic form of government does not determine its foreign policy" rears its head -- only this time in the form of Manmohan Singh, not Vladimir Putin. China may get much of its oil and natural gas from India, and Russia may be supplying it with its weapons, but, as Nina Hachigian explains, India too has a "strategic partnership" with Iran -- as well as rapidly increasing fuel consumption -- that would, shall we say, influence its position toward imposing strong measures on a large-scale natural gas supplier. Moreover, we have a much better chance of persuading dissenters, whether they be dictatorships or democracies, by engaging them through an established institution rather than by locking them out in the cold.

I'm not sure whether McCain genuinely believes that a "League of Democracies" is a good idea, whether his foreign policy advisors have coached him to keep bringing it up, or whether it registers a smidgen of support from the American population. While some of his top advisors, such as Robert Kagan, are proponents of the League, and McCain does seem enthusiastic about it, talk of the League has been muted in recent months, which only makes it stranger that he would bring it up in both debates thus far.

My speculation is that McCain is mentioning the "League of Democracies" strategically. It sounds nice, it seems promising on the surface level, and many people may not know just how infeasible and counter-productive it would be. Not delving into the details of the proposal -- by simply putting it out there as a means to an end, the link connecting "current situation" and "defeating Iran's nuclear ambitions" -- just serves to further minimize the threat of these looming obstacles, making what will surely be a very difficult process seem much, much too easy.

I've been remiss in plugging the excellent new blog by former Citizens for Global Solutions CEO Charles Brown. UnDiplomatic has been a daily read for me since it launched a few weeks ago. Brown brings a wealth of experience from the advocacy community and government. He is closely attuned with the inner-workings of international diplomacy.

Brown takes a look at the Administration's decision to rescind the U.S.-Russia Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation, (also called a "123 Agreement"). In the Washington Post, Michael Abramowitz describes the agreement as this:

The civil nuclear agreement was signed in Moscow four months ago, after two years of negotiations. Among other things, the deal would facilitate joint ventures between the Russian and U.S. nuclear industries, and would clear the way for Russia to import thousands of tons of spent nuclear fuel, a business potentially worth billions of dollars.

Not everyone see's the utility of this move. Also from the Washington Post:

Robert J. Einhorn, a specialist on nuclear nonproliferation at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, expressed doubt that withdrawing the nuclear accord would provide much leverage with Moscow, noting that the deal is as much in Washington's interest as Russia's. He said the deal would make it easier for the countries to cooperate in fighting nuclear proliferation and in keeping nuclear material out of the hands of terrorists, both top priorities for the Bush administration.

Finally, Brown explains:

For those not familiar with 123 agreements, they are named after Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which requires that the U.S. government negotiate and sign an agreement with a given country before commerce in nuclear materials can be established.

Although 123 agreements can be controversial in and of themselves (as is the case with the U.S.-India pact), they also offer a way to help promote nonproliferation and the reduction of nuclear stockpiles.

The era of U.S.-Russian cooperation on nukes may have just come to an end.

The biggest news this weekend was not Senator Obama's This Week interview, or Tom Brady's left knee. Rather, it came out of Vienna, where a somewhat obscure intergovernmental organization--the Nuclear Suppliers Group--succumbed to heavy US lobbying and agreed to allow India to receive nuclear technology and know-how. The quote above is how the Arms Control Association's Daryl Kimball describes the decision.

The quick back story is this. In 1974, the Indian government detonated a nuclear weapon that was fashioned from diverted civilian nuclear technology. This was a first. Never before had civilian nuclear technology been used to create a nuclear weapons program. To make matters worse, India is not even a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. So, to prevent something like this from happening again, countries with nuclear materials and know-how banded together to impose strict conditions on the sale or transfer of civilian nuclear technology. This became the Vienna-based Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Fast forward thirty years. India is still not a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Nuclear Suppliers Group still refuses to transfer or sell of nuclear materials to India. That is, until Saturday, when the NSG issued a waiver permitting the transfer of civilian nuclear technology to India, thereby unraveling a key tenet of non-proliferation: if a country diverts civilian nuclear technology to a weapons program it will be denied access to civilian technologies.

Why the turnaround?

The Bush administration considers India (the world's largest democracy) a key regional ally and wants to reward New Dehli's pro-American alliance. Many (though not all) members of congress agreed in principal that India's nuclear sanctions should be lifted.

The problem, though, is that this deal sets a disturbing precedent that might complicate negotiations with other proliferators like Iran (which, after all, also claims to only be pursuing a civilian nuclear program). Then, of course, there are regional consequences of the India waiver, namely the knock-on effect it would have on Pakistan's nuclear ambitions. Daryl Kimball puts it succinctly:

As a result, the India-specific exemption from NSG guidelines severely erodes the credibility of global efforts to ensure that access to peaceful nuclear trade and technology is available only to those states that meet global nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament standards.

Also, nuclear fuel sales to India for Indian power reactors may marginally help increase India's energy output, but at the same time it will free up India's limited domestic uranium supplies to be used exclusively for bomb-making. This will lead Pakistan to follow suit and help fuel the South Asian arms race.

Finally, Paul Kerr explores the deleterious effect of this deal on American diplomacy at the United Nations. In 1998 the Security Council passed resolution 1172 in the wake of dueling nuclear test explosions by India and Pakistan. The resolution called on member states to "prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology that could in any way assist programmes in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons, and welcomes national policies adopted and declared in this respect."

This NSG waiver completely undermines that resolution and in the process undermines the Security Council's non-proliferation work more broadly. If you think this doesn't really matter, consider that the Council is currently the only body trying to coax Iran back from the nuclear brink.

We need to be propping these institutions up, not tearing them down.

(Photo from Flickr)

Today is the 40th anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The New Republic summons its better half as J. Peter Scoblic explains why this treaty is such a boon to American interests.

Today marks the fortieth birthday of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, one of the most important pieces of paper the United States has signed in the last half century--and one of the most popular. Even Bush officials, who went on a treaty-killing spree during their first year in office, made an exception for the NPT.

Why wouldn't they? The NPT is one of the best deals the United States has ever made: It allowed five countries (including the United States) to possess nuclear weapons, but banned the rest from ever developing them. Today, every country on the planet except for India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan is a member. While pressuring the nuclear states to disarm, the NPT's most significant accomplishment has been to reassure non-nuclear states that they don't need the bomb, and in the past four decades more countries have given up nuclear weapons programs than have started them. In hindsight, the NPT seems like a diplomatic no-brainer.

While its true that the NPT has generally works as is, it still needs help if it is to remain the foundation of the global non-proliferation regime into the future.

The treaty was based on three pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament, and legitimate civilian use. The disarmament pillar, for one, has taken a hit in recent years. Some NPT signatories have shied away from reducing their nuclear arsenal and are even developing so-called tactical nuclear weapons. For the other pillars to remain on strong footing, member states need to recommit to disarmament.

In an On Day One video, Matthew Yglesias explains why this is such a critical national security imperative for the next United States president.

Yet another way the NPT could be strengthened is through IAEA chief Mohammed elBaradei's call for a civilian nuclear fuel bank. This is an idea that the (United Nations Foundation sister organization) the Nuclear Threat Initiative has been pushing for a long time--and for which Warren Buffet has provided a seed grant to support. The idea, in short, is for the IAEA to have a standing reserve of low-enriched uranium as an insurance policy for countries that seek to develop civilian nuclear power, but must import their enriched uranium rather than enrich it themselves. This way, countries with civilian nuclear programs can ensure that their supply of low-enriched uranium (the kind not used in bombs) will remain stable. So far, a number of governments--including the United States government--has pledged funds to develop the fuel bank.

Both these ideas underscore that the NPT, while a proven counter-proliferation tool, needs all the help it can get to remain the foundation of the global non-proliferation regime.

Via Foreign Policy, North Korea destroys its reactor tower at Yongbyon.

Diplomacy works! And if done correctly, can even lead to adversaries blowing up their own nuclear facilities.

If any weapon deserve to be banned, it seems that so-called "cluster bombs" fit the bill. A description from The Washington Post:

The weapons consist of canisters packed with small bombs, or "bomblets," that spread over a large area when a canister is dropped from a plane or fired from the ground. While the bomblets are designed to explode on impact, they frequently do not. Civilians, particularly children, are often maimed or killed when they pick up unexploded bombs, sometimes years later.

Despite the bombs' deplorable after-effects, the United States opted not to sign onto an agreement to ban the weapons. I'm not sure which justification is less defensible: that cluster bombs are a valuable part of the U.S. military's arsenal (they have not been used at all in over five years) or that banning them could somehow hinder the U.S.'s disaster relief efforts.

Likewise, the fact that the other major users and producers of the bombs -- Russia, China, Israel, and Pakistan -- also did not sign the treaty does not seem to warrant retaining cluster bombs for defensive reasons. That said, there may still be hope for curbing the use of these munitions. Remember: the United States also did not sign the 1997 ban on landmines -- and that has not inspired it to join the lonely ranks of Burma in planting the deadly devices. Perhaps, though, it'd be better to just sign both treaties and come out against weapons that mutilate and kill children.

Both the Post and the Times relay a number of reactions to the National Intelligence Estimate report on Iran. Over in Geneva, the International Atomic Energy Agency has a response of its own. "The Estimate tallies with the Agency's consistent statements over the last few years that, although Iran still needs to clarify some important aspects of its past and present nuclear activities, the Agency has no concrete evidence of an ongoing nuclear weapons program or undeclared nuclear facilities in Iran." In other words, the NIE report confirms that the IAEA has been right about Iran all along, much like it was correct about the state of Iraq's nuclear program in March 2003.