Author John Boonstra

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John Boonstra

Natsios spins the g-word

If Andrew Natsios, the former U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan who now makes a hobby of criticizing current policy toward the country, had some actual policy recommendations, I'd have an easier time taking him seriously. As it is, his most substantive gripe is that people keep using the "g-word."

As Mark argued before, what's important is not what we call the situation in Darfur. We should have moved beyond that debate long ago. Instead, partially due to activist groups, yes, but equally to those critics like Natsios who furiously -- and wrongheadedly -- contend that because not that many people are dying, it can't be "genocide," the conversation remains stuck on the level of classification. This "g-word" politics only ties the hand of actual policy and, from both sides, makes it more difficult to address the issues that everyone acknowledges are important: chiefly, securing a peace accord and ensuring that the fragile North-South deal does not collapse.

Calling what happened in Darfur by its rightful name, "genocide," does not impede our ability to talk with Khartoum. Conversely, vehemently insisting that the word not be used does not give us an upper hand in negotiations. It's not easy to formulate a Darfur policy, but there has to be one that transcends this stale debate of how to employ a word fraught with political and moral overtones.

Tragic irony in Somalia

Excuse me if I find some irony in Ethiopia declining the Somali government's request to send troops, when all indicators point to the likelihood that Ethiopia already sent some of its troops "reconnaissance missions" over the border weeks ago. (Not to mention the irony of Somalia inviting back the very military presence that its citizens railed against for over two years.)

But really -- it's hard not to understand Ethiopia's reluctance. Ditto that of every other neighboring country to which the Somali government's request was made: Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Yemen. There's a reason that the only troops in the 4,300-strong African Union force in Somalia are from Uganda and Burundi, which share the important characteristic of not bordering Somalia.  I don't think others will be joining them too soon.

Somalia's leaders are right in that their country is being attacked by "foreign terrorists" -- though the latter part of that label, referring to domestic groups like al-Shaban, is much more true than the former, even as the risk of Somalia turning into a global terrorist haven grows. But what makes this an issue that no one wants to touch is that it is also a political one: combating the terrorists also amounts to protecting the government, and, as well-intentioned as the attempt to stabilize the country's shaky state institutions may be, that amounts to taking a side in a messy internal political dynamic.

So the irony is painfully evident when Ethiopia cites as its reason not to (officially) involve itself militarily in Somalia the lack of an "international mandate." The reason the UN would be so ill-advised to issue its stamp of approval on a renewed Ethiopian intervention, or on creating a new peacekeeping mission, is exactly the reason that its neighbors don't want to risk getting involved: rather than halting the flood of violence, Ethiopian or blue helmet presence would only provide targets for extremists, as well as a lodestar for generating grassroots support. This explication, of course, will provide little consolation for Somalia's beleaguered government, which simply needs somebody to do something, and quickly.

Pakistani offensive moves into Waziristan

The fighting between the Pakistani military and Taliban insurgents that has already displaced more than two million people has now moved into the Federally Administered Tribal Area of South Waziristan (just south of the already affected province of Lower Dir). 40,000 people have already started moving out of the area.

South Waziristan is not a hugely populous area, and the latest wrinkle to Pakistan's unprecedented displacement crisis is that many in South Waziristan evidently -- this was a surprise to me -- have "second homes" to avoid the typically harsh winters. Add that to the dynamic whereby 80%-plus of displaced Pakistanis are being taken in by other Pakistani families, rather than taking shelter in camps, and you have a situation that is just sustainable enough to be direly unsustainable.

This whole situation also really puts in perspective the rhetoric that used to be tossed around about "fighting terrorists over there so we don't have to fight them here."  For millions of Pakistanis, "over there" is right here.

Heraldo Munoz to lead Bhutto investigation

Your UN ambassador-related gossip from over the weekend:

Chile's U.N. Ambassador Heraldo Munoz will head a six-month U.N. inquiry into the 2007 assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, a U.N. spokeswoman said on Friday.

Munoz is an upstanding diplomat and a fine choice; he is best remembered for his presence on the Security Council in the run-up to the Iraq war in 2003, pushing the United States to give UN weapons inspectors more time to do their job.

His new mission may prove even tougher than trying to dissuade the hawks in the George W. Bush administration from launching a preventive war (and possibly even trickier than captaining a soccer team of fellow UN diplomats). These sort of investigations can turn into a long-lasting adventure (the original inquiry into the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, for example, took just a month, but the whole investigation has continued for over four years) and encroach onto very sensitive political territory. Munoz's commission is a fact-finding one, though, so he has the somewhat good fortune of being able to turn the results over to someone else to figure out what to do with them.

A potentially good sign: another member of the "Bhutto Commission" is the Irishman Peter Fitzgerald, whose experience includes having led the Hariri investigation.

More than two possible outcomes in Iran

Dan Drezner has some sharp analysis of the impact that the incipient Iranian revolution electoral unrest in Iran is having on the region, particularly Russia. But I think he's a little too limiting in his read on the likely endgame of this very fascinating mess.
As the previous paragraphs suggest, I'm pretty sure a Rubicon has been crossed in Iran that can't be uncrossed. This isn't 1999 and 2003 -- too many days have passed with the Khamenei regime on the defensive. The regime as it existed for the past twenty years -- hemmed-in democracy combined with clerical rule -- is not going to be able to continue. With the largest protests of the past week scheduled for tomorrow, I think this ends in one of two ways: the removal of Ahmadinejad and Khamenei from power, or bloodshed on a scale that we cannot comprehend.
He may be right, and a Rubicon may indeed have been crossed, with no going back to "the way things were" in Iran. That certainly seems to be the consensus. But I also wonder if it might be a bit of wishful thinking. There's a tendency to imbue events as-they're-happening as more important than they may turn out to be. To take just the color revolutions to which it has been so trendy to compare the situation in Iran: Ukraine's "Orange" and Georgia's "Rose" (not to mention Kyrgyzstan's "Tulip") were certainly major events, but the hype that they generated at the time far surpasses the attention that those countries, modestly different though their governments might be, attract today. I think more useful comparisons would be Tianenmen or, better, the monks' uprising in Burma in late 2007. What these examples -- or even, as I suggested before, those of Kenya or Zimbabwe -- show us is the possibility of an outcome distinct from Drezner's either-or (or both) model. At the time, many thought that Burma's junta couldn't possibly survive such a brutal onslaught against the country's most venerable institution. But...it survived. In Iran, the possibilities are simply too many to predict: Khamenei may retrench, and allow Ahmadinejad to take the fall; or, the two of them may make some sort of minor concession to the protestors; or again, they could simply wait until the crowds peter out. Revolution is not inevitable. In such an interesting situation, nothing is. (image from flickr user Hamed Saber under a Creative Commons license)

Human trafficking is a worldwide problem

From Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's op-ed in The New York Times today:
Around the world, millions of people are living in bondage. They labor in fields and factories under threat of violence if they try to escape. They work in homes for families that keep them virtually imprisoned. They are forced to work as prostitutes or to beg in the streets. Women, men and children of all ages are often held far from home with no money, no connections and no way to ask for help. They discover too late that they've entered a trap of forced labor, sexual exploitation and brutal violence. The United Nations estimates that at least 12 million people worldwide are victims of trafficking. Because they often live and work out of sight, that number is almost certainly too low. More than half of all victims of forced labor are women and girls, compelled into servitude as domestics or sweatshop workers or...forced into prostitution. They face not only the loss of their freedom but also sexual assaults and physical abuses. To some, human trafficking may seem like a problem limited to other parts of the world. In fact, it occurs in every country, including the United States, and we have a responsibility to fight it just as others do. The destructive effects of trafficking have an impact on all of us. Trafficking weakens legitimate economies, breaks up families, fuels violence, threatens public health and safety, and shreds the social fabric that is necessary for progress. It undermines our long-term efforts to promote peace and prosperity worldwide. And it is an affront to our values and our commitment to human rights. [emphasis mine]
Clinton also makes the point that trafficking is especially prevalent in economic downturns, as the incentive to turn to exploitation only increases. With seemingly every other op-ed in the world opining on the Iranian elections, it's comforting to see that the U.S. State Department still focuses on priorities (beyond ensuring that Iranians can still use Twitter) that fewer people are paying attention to.

Show the IAEA the money!

In a time when the world is focused on potential nuclear threats from North Korea and Iran, when the Taliban can come within sixty miles of the capital of another unstable nuclear country, and when nonproliferation is one of the first words out of many leaders' mouths, one might reasonably assume that the IAEA, the world's nuclear watchdog, would be the one global body that, even in a tight financial climate, everyone would agree should be fully funded. But alas, it's a UN agency, so, unsurprisingly, some countries are balking at contributing the funds that the IAEA needs to do its job. What is surprising is that the United States, for whom the nonsensical policy of "zero growth" was once a mantra, is not among these reluctant donors. In keeping with Congress's refreshing decision to fully repay U.S. arrears to the UN, the Obama Administration has pledged to up its contributions to the IAEA by 20%, a not insignificant amount from the agency's biggest donor. The IAEA has long been seeking an 11% budget increase, but some European countries, as well as Japan, the body's second largest donor, are still trying to push the budget back down to a level of zero growth. The IAEA's Director is understandably frustrated at this situation -- perhaps he is also feeling the stress from the Board of Director's continued struggle to elect his successor -- but, as I'm sure Ban Ki-moon can attest, he might want to choose his words a little more carefully, even when the doors are closed.